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INTRODUCTION 
“Reality has left the physical world and moved into the virtual one.”1 
 
Reality is a daunting concept. Most people have an intuitive 
understanding of the stuff of reality, but this gut feeling comfortably remains 
at the level of the subconscious. We know it’s “out there,” but it is a neglectful 
acknowledgement: 
Few of us think about ‘reality’ much . . . . It is, perhaps, the conceptual 
equivalent of unconscious motor functions such as breathing. It is vital to 
life—without it, we would be unable to distinguish the real from the 
imaginary, the true from the false, the natural from the artificial. But we do 
not have to think about it to use it—indeed, as soon as we do start thinking 
about it, it becomes extremely difficult to continue using it. For this reason, 
perhaps, some may regard it as a peculiar subject for any sort of analysis: it is 
a given, a fact of life, and best left hidden behind the curtain of 
unconsciousness.2 
This intuitive human feeling for reality (and the accompanying 
reluctance to open the can of worms that comes with examining it more 
than subconsciously) persists throughout copyright law. Indeed, it is rare to 
find a judicial opinion that explicitly refers to the concept of reality; 
instead, that thing we intuitively understand to be reality looms 
anonymously just below the surface of legal reasoning. For example, courts 
refer obliquely to “actual groups,—visible things,”3 “subject matter,”4 and 
“facts in the world.”5 The meaning of reality is considered, perhaps, too 
intuitive or too overwhelming for direct analysis. 
The concept of reality, however, has a great deal of influence in copyright 
law. Copyright law has carved out reality as that thing which is not protected, 
particularly as technologies have emerged which use reality heavily as a 
medium of expression.6 This seems reasonable—reality as we commonly 
 
1 BENJAMIN WOOLLEY, VIRTUAL WORLDS: A JOURNEY IN HYPE AND HYPERREALITY 235 (1992). 
2 Id. at 2-3. 
3 Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 249 (1903). 
4 Franklin Mint Corp. v. Nat’l Wildlife Art Exch., 575 F.2d 62, 65 (3d Cir. 1978). 
5 Meshwerks, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., 528 F.3d 1258, 1264 (10th Cir. 2008). 
6 See infra subsection II.A.3.a (the “subject matter” of photographs is not protected); Section 
II.B (“facts” and “discoveries” are not protected). 
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understand it is not authored,7 and thus not fixed and not original.8 However, 
because copyright law has grappled with the concept of reality obliquely and 
anonymously, we are left uncertain about precisely what role the concept 
holds in copyright law. Can reality ever be authored? Is all of reality part of 
the commons, or just certain segments of reality? How can using reality as a 
referent impact the availability of copyright protection for creators? The 
answers to these questions are not immediately apparent. 
It is at this point that the proposition that reality is best left unexamined 
loses its footing. Our intuitive sense of reality may no longer suffice as a tool 
of legal analysis because we are on the verge of a “new reality,” as artificial 
reality technologies make the artificial an ever more real part of our daily 
lives.9 Mark Bolas, an expert on augmented and virtual reality technologies, 
foresees a future in which the virtual and real intermingle completely.10 And 
as early as 1991, the main theme of Britain’s first virtual reality conference was 
how technology “could manipulate reality to the point of being able to create 
it.”11 Confronting such new technologies, which are termed variously and 
nonexhaustively as virtual reality, augmented reality, mixed reality, hybrid 
reality, and cognitive reality,12 courts may reasonably analogize to or 
distinguish from reality itself.13 Or perhaps, do the same with other 
 
7 See, e.g., F. SAMUEL BRAINARD, REALITY’S FUGUE: RECONCILING WORLDVIEWS IN 
PHILOSOPHY, RELIGION, AND SCIENCE 203 n.1 (2017) (“‘[R]eal’ historically refers to what exists 
independently of our minds. Used in this historical sense, the term distinguishes naturally occurring 
things and properties . . . from creations of our minds . . . .”). But see infra Section II.B (discussing 
the importance of perspective to the proposition that reality is not authored). 
8 Both the fixation and originality requirements of copyright law require an author. A work 
must be fixed by an author, see 17 U.S.C. §101 (2012) (“A work is ‘fixed’ in a tangible medium of 
expression when . . . by or under the authority of the author . . . .”) (emphasis added); to be original it 
must be independently created by an author. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 
340, 346 (1991) (“Original, as the term is used in copyright, means only that the work was 
independently created by the author (as opposed to copied from other works), and that it possesses at 
least some minimal degree of creativity.” (emphasis added)). 
9 See generally Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Law, Virtual Reality, and Augmented 
Reality, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 1051 (2018) (discussing how augmented reality and virtual reality 
may challenge legal doctrine). 
10 Nick Wingfield, At Windows 10 Event, Microsoft Jumps into Augmented Reality with 
HoloLens Headset, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/22/technology/
microsoft-to-give-away-windows-10-in-move-to-woo-software-developers.html (quoting Bolas 
as noting that “[t]he question is when we can mix virtual and real worlds seamlessly, what are we 
going to want to do? . . . I don’t think anyone has an answer to that” (internal quotations omitted)). 
11 WOOLLEY, supra note 1, at 5. 
12 See JON PEDDIE, AUGMENTED REALITY: WHERE WE WILL ALL LIVE 9 (2017) (listing 
thirty-seven different labels for immersive reality technologies and noting that immersive reality “is a 
multidiscipline multi-labeled and massively confusing collection of technologies, applications, and 
opportunities”). For simplicity, this Comment refers to this bundle of technologies as “new reality.” 
13 These two options can be seen playing out in scholarship surrounding new realities. 
Compare STEFAN LARSSON, CONCEPTIONS IN THE CODE: HOW METAPHORS EXPLAIN 
LEGAL CHALLENGES IN DIGITAL TIMES 4 (2017) (writing that the descriptor “virtual reality” 
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technologies that purport to use reality as a medium of expression.14 The path 
that courts will take is not clear, and undoubtedly the particular modifiers 
used to describe the technology (mixed, augmented, hybrid, etc.) will lead 
courts in different directions. However, a clear understanding of what 
copyright law currently understands “reality” to be is a good place to start. 
The goal of this Comment is to bring the place of reality in copyright law 
out of the shadows. Because we are in the early stages of new reality 
technologies, this Comment’s approach is descriptive and evaluative rather 
than normative. It aims to reveal how reality has been understood in 
copyright law, organize these understandings into a coherent conceptual 
model,15 and then briefly critique that conceptual model in terms of its 
potential implications for new reality technologies. It does not seek to 
propose how reality should be defined, or how new reality technologies should 
be treated, as a proper analysis of these issues will depend heavily on the 
precise nature of the technologies. Currently, these technologies are simply 
too nascent and varied for discrete analysis. 
Because the concept of reality is so heavily obscured within copyright case 
law, this Comment uses conceptual metaphors as its key archeological tool to 
expose reality’s content and analytical significance. A metaphor is a cognitive 
tool that transfers something from a familiar source domain to an unfamiliar 
target domain.16 In copyright case law, reality appears implicitly as the target 
domain, while courts use language from more familiar source domains (for 
example, subject matter or facts) to discuss it. For instance, the keystone 
reality-is-the-original conceptual metaphor reveals that reality is relevant to 
copyright law in its role as a referent.17 
 
suggests that it is spatially and qualitatively distinct from reality), with DAVID R. KOEPSELL, 
THE ONTOLOGY OF CYPERSPACE: PHILOSOPHY, LAW, AND THE FUTURE OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 9 (1992) (wondering whether extending intellectual property 
protection into the virtual world “[w]ould not . . . require at least a strong analogy of virtual 
reality to actual reality or Real Life (‘RL’)”). 
14 See LARSSON, supra note 13, at 6 (“One should bear in mind that technology never simply 
is—it is always interpreted within the context and society that it arises and exists in, and thereby 
becomes dependent on older technologies and already existing concepts that we adopt to understand 
the new.”). Photography is the most common and attractive medium for courts to analogize to when 
facing new highly accurate technologies. See infra subsection II.A.3.b (discussing the problematic 
use of photography generally as a source domain for other highly accurate technologies). 
15 For the value of conceptual maps and models to legal thinking, see STEVEN L. WINTER, A 
CLEARING IN THE FOREST: LAW, LIFE, AND MIND xiii (2001) (“What legal actors need . . . is 
something like a cognitive map of the cultural models and other social constructs that animate 
thinking and decisionmaking among lawyers, judges, and laypersons alike.”). 
16 See infra Section I.C (introducing conceptual metaphor theory). 
17 See infra Section II.A. 
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Indeed, the nature of the referent has vital analytical significance in 
copyright law because it is key to deciding both originality and infringement.18 
The originality standard is a constitutional requirement for copyright 
protection.19 A work may only be protected if some element of the work is 
original; protection, however, only extends to those original elements.20 Prior 
to the Supreme Court’s 1991 decision in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone 
Services Co., courts required only that a work have an author and not be 
copied.21 In Feist, the Supreme Court heightened the originality standard by 
also requiring that a work be minimally creative.22 Post-Feist, the originality 
standard has two prongs: (1) the work must be the independent creation of an 
author, as opposed to being copied from another work; and (2) the work must 
possess some minimal degree of creativity.23 On the other hand, infringement 
requires actual copying of another author’s work. Thus, we must be keenly 
aware of whether an author’s referent contains other works. 
Because the nature of the referent is central to determining both originality 
and infringement, it is critical that we understand what constitutes reality and 
how courts treat the special case where reality is the referent.24 The fundamental 
message of this Comment is that reality-as-referent is treated differently 
 
18 See infra Section II.A. The concept of reality emerges in numerous doctrines of copyright 
law. For example, reality is relevant to the idea-expression/fact-expression dichotomy and the fair 
use doctrine. However, this Comment primarily uses judicial analysis of the originality doctrine to 
construct its ontology of reality because there the concept of reality is most analytically significant. 
19 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991). 
20 See id. at 348 (“The mere fact that a work is copyrighted does not mean that every element 
of the work may be protected. Originality remains the sine qua non of copyright; accordingly, copyright 
protection may extend only to those components of a work that are original to the author.”). 
21 See, e.g., Alfred Bell & Co. Ltd. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 102-03 (2d Cir. 1951) 
(“All that is needed to satisfy both the Constitution and the statute is that the ‘author’ contributed 
something more than a ‘merely trivial’ variation, something recognizably ‘his own.’ Originality in 
this context ‘means little more than a prohibition of actual copying.’ No matter how poor artistically 
the ‘author’s’ addition, it is enough if it be his own.”). 
22 499 U.S. at 345 (1991). 
23 Id. The Court emphasized that the requirement of minimal creativity is, indeed, minimal. 
See id. at 345, 363 (emphasizing that the level of creativity required is “extremely low” and “de 
minimis”). The Court also restated that originality does not require uniqueness or novelty. Id. The 
work at issue in Feist was a phone book listing names in alphabetical order, a work which may be 
original in its selection, coordination, and arrangement. Id. at 358, 363. However, here the 
alphabetical method was not found to be sufficiently creative because it was deemed “time-honored,” 
“practically inevitable,” and “an age-old practice, firmly rooted in tradition and so commonplace that 
it has come to be expected as a matter of course.” Id. at 363-64. These passages suggest that 
something once considered creative may fall out of protection by becoming commonplace. See infra 
Part IV, discussing the potential for application of a more robust merger doctrine to new reality 
technologies: if created works become a commonplace part of our reality, public policy may demand 
that they lose copyright protection. 
24 See infra subsection II.A.3 (discussing the originality-is-variation conceptual metaphor and 
the prototype effect, where courts understand inaccurate representations of reality to be more 
creative than accurate representations). 
 
1274 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 167: 1269 
depending on its content. Segments of reality that have no human creator are 
truly available referents for subsequent creativity, while segments of reality with 
some other human author are more qualified referents due to concerns about 
potential infringement. On the other hand, where reality-as-referent is created 
or composed by the author, the ensuing work is considered to be far more creative 
than a work that uses unmediated, pre-existing reality as a referent. 
Authorship and perspective are also critically important to 
understanding the role of reality in copyright law. In this Comment’s 
ontology, reality encompasses everything not created by the particular 
author at hand (whom this Comment terms the “next creator”). In other 
words, reality includes everything that does not “owe[] its origin”25 to the next 
creator: things that have no human author and things that have a different 
human author. Understanding reality from the perspective of the next 
creator26 is essential to reconciling the common view of reality as including 
both created and non-created things with the Supreme Court’s 
characterization of facts and discoveries—both commonly equated with 
reality through the reality-is-facts and facts-are-discoveries conceptual 
metaphors—as non-created. Simply put, reality is not viewpoint neutral. 
Reality is also infused with a normative underbelly, as reality is 
understood to be an essential part of the commons. The commons—defined 
at a high level of generality—is a reservoir of resources generally accessible 
by the public for use without restriction. Because creativity is essentially 
derivative, the commons is a freely accessible, referential source for future 
creators. We must appreciate the normative underpinnings of reality in 
order to effectively approach new reality technologies—essentially, 
simulations—that threaten to make a work indistinguishable from its 
referent. By blurring the lines between reality and representation, these 
technologies will challenge how we define the difference between reality 
and the works copyright law seeks to protect. In doing so, these technologies 
may encroach upon reality’s normative home in the commons. 
This Comment begins in Part I by outlining a conceptual toolbox for 
approaching the controversial concept of reality: commonsense ontology, 
 
25 See Feist, 499 U.S. at 346 (1991) (defining author as “he to whom anything owes its origin; 
originator; maker” (quoting Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884))). 
26 Indeed, it is the next creator’s perspective we care about when analyzing originality. See 
Alfred Bell, 191 F.2d at 102 (“‘Original’ in reference to a copyright work means that the particular 
work ‘owes its origin’ to the ‘author.’” (quoting Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 
53, 58 (1884))). Where representations of reality are protected, it is because there is an infusion of 
subjectivity in the representation. Indeed, in copyright law, evidence of a dash of human subjectivity 
may suffice to make a work original. See, e.g., Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 
239, 250 (1903) (“The copy is the personal reaction of an individual upon nature. Personality always 
contains something unique. It expresses its singularity even in handwriting, and a very modest grade 
of art has in it something irreducible, which is one man’s alone.”). 
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categorization, and conceptual metaphor theory. Part II explores the two 
predominant reality metaphors in copyright law: reality-is-the-original and 
reality-is-facts. It also explores several ancillary metaphors: reality-is-commons, 
reality-is-subject-matter, originality-is-variation, and facts-are-discoveries. Using 
these conceptual metaphors, Part II pieces together an ontology of reality from 
the perspective of the next creator. Part III pulls together the interrelated 
conceptual metaphors to summarize and illustrate this conceptual model of 
reality. And finally, Part IV points toward some of the implications of this 
conceptual model for new reality technologies. 
I. CONCEPTUAL APPROACH 
There is, of course, no single understanding of reality or conceptual 
approach to describing it.27 The task of forming an ontology of reality 
depends heavily on one’s perspective and purpose in attempting the 
mammoth definitional task. This Comment inquires into the ontology of 
reality for copyright law only. Its objective is not to normatively assess what 
the ontology of reality ought to be in copyright law, but to sketch the outlines 
of the ontology of reality as it is and provide some broad critiques. 
Thus, the conceptual tools this Comment employs should allow us to: (1) 
confine our analysis to the place of reality in copyright law without becoming 
entangled in larger issues of metaphysical truth; (2) burrow underneath the 
oblique language in judicial opinions and uncover how the concept of reality is 
understood and operationalized; and (3) develop a conceptual model that may 
be used to effectively critique the current ontology of reality in copyright case 
law. With these three purposes in mind, this Comment employs a combination 
of commonsense ontology, radial categorization, and conceptual metaphor 
theory. These conceptual tools have been used by legal scholars to describe and 
analyze the ways in which courts have grappled with technological change in 
various areas of intellectual property law, and thus they are particularly 
appropriate for our analysis of reality in light of new reality technologies. This 
Section briefly discusses each conceptual approach in turn. 
A. Commonsense Ontology 
In his book tackling the issue of intellectual property protection in 
“cyberspace,” David R. Koepsell argued that “commonsense ontology” is the 
best way to evaluate legal concepts in areas where the issue of realness is 
 
27 See WOOLLEY, supra note 1, at 4 (“There has never been a totally secure view of reality, 
certainly not in the industrial era of history.”). 
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implicated.28 According to Koepsell, we can engage in commonsense 
ontology without being troubled by the ultimate question of metaphysics (i.e. 
the study of the meaning of reality qua reality), noting that 
a commonsense ontology can be developed without regard to the questions 
. . . which inquire into the ultimate reality of the objects of inquiry. An 
acceptance of the use of common terms which refer to objects commonly 
understood, and the relations which may exist between those terms and our 
experiences, is all we need in order to categorize the world. Developing a 
commonsense ontology requires an admission that we cannot satisfactorily 
answer the ultimate metaphysical questions regarding what may be real and 
what may not be real. Rather, it requires only an acceptance of the facts of 
common experience, without regard to their deeper reality.29 
Metaphysics implicates questions of the realness or truth of objects: how do 
we know that the objects we perceive are actually real? For the practical, 
evidentiary purposes of the law, however, we are not concerned with such 
questions. At a base level of reliability (defined extensively by evidence law), 
we accept that what we perceive is sufficiently real or true for the purposes of 
the law. And although the ultimate nature of reality is deeply controversial, 
we “may come to agreements regarding relations between perceived things 
without agreement as to the nature or reality of the things themselves.”30 
Indeed, the legal system requires it. 
Thus, developing an ontology of reality in copyright law—a mapping of 
the concepts and categories of reality using the tools of experience, 
perception, and language—provides common ground despite the lack of 
consensus on the ultimate nature of reality. The question becomes: whether 
our perceptions are ultimately real or not, how does copyright law make sense of what 
we perceive? Thus, as a baseline, this Comment will accept the hotly debated 
propositions that: (1) reality does have an objective existence; (2) reality can 
be perceived; and (3) reality can be empirically studied. These are 
metaphysical rather than ontological issues. 
The core practice of commonsense ontology is not reasoning from a priori 
first principles, but observing the ways in which language is used to order and 
categorize objects.31 The addition of “commonsense” denotes that such an 
 
28 KOEPSELL, supra note 13, at 22-32. While this subsection focuses on Koepsell’s conceptual 
methods, the thrust of Koepsell’s substantive argument is that the current ontology of copyright law 
fails to treat all mediums of expression equally. Id. at 13-17. In his view, this is an ontological flaw 
that must be corrected in order for copyright law to coherently deal with software. Id. 
29 Id. at 24-25.  
30 Id. at 26. 
31 Id. at 26-27 (noting that “[t]he language we use is loaded with terms which denote an 
ordering of objects of experience”). 
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ontology should be practical and logically consistent.32 Koepsell summarizes 
the process of a commonsense ontological study as follows: 
I. archeology: Choose a legal object and unravel its existing ontology . . . . 
II. ontology: Determine whether the existing legal ontology of that object 
abides by principles of formal ontology and logic. 
III. evaluation: Determine, based on II, above, whether the existing legal 
ontology is correct. 
IV. application: If the law does not embody a correct ontology, determine 
what practical problems, injustices, or inefficiencies follow as a 
consequence of the incorrect ontology. 
V. adjustment: Determine how the law could be adjusted to reflect a 
correct ontology.33 
This Comment focuses on the first step, of Koepsell’s process, 
archaeology, with brief detours into ontology, evaluation, and application. 
Though adjustment is a critical step, new reality technologies are still too 
nascent and indefinite to provide appropriate guidance regarding how the law 
could be best adjusted to incorporate them logically and consistently. 
B. Categorization 
An essential feature of an ontological study is observing and evaluating 
the way language is used to categorize and order objects.34 Indeed, our legal 
system is characterized by classification and categorization.35 In copyright law 
particularly, the classifications are manifold and often take the form of 
binaries: protectable versus unprotectable; original versus unoriginal; 
idea/fact versus expression. The list goes on. 
In his landmark study of conceptual processes in the law, Steven L. 
Winter argues that categorization should be understood in terms of 
conceptual theory, which sees the human intellect as “not principally 
representational, propositional, or computational, but rather . . . imaginative, 
 
32 Id. at 30-31. Koepsell compares this to “naïve ontology,” which does not account for logical 
consistency or practical applicability. Id. at 31. This Comment, wherever possible, seeks to reconcile 
the judicial treatment of various reality metaphors into a coherent ontology. See infra Section II.B 
(reconciling the common view of reality as including everything that is “common to all”—both 
created and noncreated—with the Supreme Court’s characterization of discoveries (and by 
extension, reality) as not authored). 
33 Id. at 40-41. 
34 Id. at 27 (“The language we use is loaded with terms which denote an ordering of objects of 
experience.”); WINTER, supra note 15, at 70 (“Categorization is the very process of reasoning itself.”). 
35 KOEPSELL, supra note 13, at 29 (“The U.S. legal system involves classification of objects.”). 
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associative, and analogical.”36 The traditional view of categorization is that 
inclusion in categories is marked by if–then necessary and sufficient 
conditions; Winter persuasively argues that this is inconsistent with studies 
of human cognition.37 In his view, categories in the law are instead 
imaginative, dynamic, flexible, and normatively infused.38 Most importantly, 
while legal categories can be understood in a “regularly, orderly, and 
systematic fashion,” they are not always internally consistent.39 
Winter introduces the concept of a “radial category,” which “consists of 
a central model or case with various extensions that, though related to the 
central case in some fashion, nevertheless cannot be generated by rule.”40 
Winters proffers an example by considering “hand” as a radial category.41 
Potential category members include the expressions: hour hand, the upper 
hand, all hands on deck, a hand of cards, lend a hand, give a hand, and hand 
that to me.42 Although the category members cannot be generated by an 
if–then rule, all are related to the central case (“hand”) by language and 
experience.43 Thus, the category is not arbitrary.44 
Using such radial categories is particularly helpful in the protectability 
doctrines of copyright law because the category boundaries are often 
defined by experience in the form of case law rather than positive if–then 
rules, classically in the form of statutes, although statutes themselves are 
rarely this clear. For example, the only codification of the idea/expression 
dichotomy—which excludes copyright protection for mere ideas—exists in 
section 102(b) of the Copyright Act, which merely lists a collection of things 
that are not protectable, including “any idea, procedure, process, system, 
method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery . . . .”45 The 
Copyright Act does not define any item on the list. Indeed, we are told in 
the legislative history that the purpose of the section 102(b) list of 
unprotectable things is to restate “that the basic dichotomy between 
 
36 WINTER, supra note 15, at 5. 
37 Id. at 69 (“On the standard view, categorization is nothing more than classification according 
to common properties. Yet, many of our most elementary and familiar categories defy that logic.”). 
38 Id. at 69. 
39 Id. at 6. 
40 Id. at 71. Other characteristics of radial categories include chaining and the prototype 
effect. Where there is chaining within a category, some of the extensions are incorporated because 
of their relation to an existing group member rather than to the central case. Id. at 75. The 
prototype effect describes a category in which some category members are better examples of the 
central case than others. Id. at 74-75. 
41 Id. at 73. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. at 74. 
44 Id. 
45 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012). 
 
2019] Copyright and Reality 1279
expression and idea [established in case law] remains unchanged.”46 Figure 
1 shows section 102(b) as a radial category. 
 
Figure 1: 17 U.S.C. §102(b) As a Radial Category 
This Comment employs radial categories as helpful tools in mapping the 
relations between reality and the many classifications of copyright law. 
Subsection II.A.3.a sketches the radial category of “creativity” in case law on 
photography and uses the “prototype effect”47 to explain why inaccurate 
photographs are considered better examples of creativity than accurate 
photographs. Section II.A revisits section 102(b) as a radial category in the 
context of analyzing whether reality is considered a category member, and if 
so, how it relates to the other category members of facts and discoveries. 
C. Conceptual Metaphor Theory 
As a cognitive tool, a metaphor transfers something from a source domain 
to a target domain containing new, unfamiliar phenomena. Put simply, it is a 
knowledge transfer across domains.48 That knowledge transfer helps us to 
better understand the unfamiliar domain: 
A memorable metaphor has the power to bring two separate domains into 
cognitive and emotional relation by using language directly appropriate to 
the one as a lens for seeing the other; the implications, suggestions, and 
46 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 57 (1976). 
47 This effect is characteristic of radial categories and occurs when some category members are 
considered better examples of the central case than other category members. This would not occur if category 
membership was produced by if–then logic because presumably all category members would obtain equal 
status by having met the necessary or sufficient condition. See WINTER, supra note 15, at 85. 
48 See id. at 13 (noting that metaphor “refers to a tightly structured set of conceptual mappings 
in which a target domain is understood in terms of a source domain of more readily comprehended 
embodied or social experience”). 
1280 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 167: 1269 
supporting values entwined with the literal use of the metaphorical 
expression enable us to see a new subject matter in a new way.49 
Indeed, the analogy (simply a form of metaphor) is a favorite tool of the 
lawyer and jurist. The conceptual structure of a metaphor is conventionally 
depicted using the phrasing “target-domain-is-source-domain,” which this 
Comment will adopt.50 
Metaphors are often deployed when the law confronts technological 
change.51 Particularly in the areas of telecommunications and internet law, 
scholars have effectively used cognitive metaphor theory to analyze judicial 
reasoning.52 While conceptual metaphor theory has been applied very 
successfully in these areas, it has not yet been applied to the concept of reality 
in copyright law. Because the concept of reality often appears anonymously, 
conceptual metaphors are particularly valuable tools for uncovering how 
courts are implicitly thinking about reality. This Comment uses conceptual 
metaphor theory to reveal the ways in which courts evoke the concept of 
 
49  MAX BLACK, MODELS AND METAPHORS: STUDIES IN LANGUAGE AND PHILOSOPHY 
236-237 (1962). 
50 WINTER, supra note 15, at 13. Note that the linguistic representation of a metaphor can take 
many forms. This Comment uses the metaphor specifically to refer to the conceptual move of 
transferring a concept from a source domain to a target domain, hence the choice of phrasing. 
51 See LARSSON, supra note 13, at 8 (“By pointing out how we understand abstract 
phenomena metaphorically, particularly with regards to how we express patterns or recurring 
structures, we may unravel some of the legal challenges that we have to tangle with as a result of 
rapid technology-related change.”). 
52 For studies of judicial reasoning in times of technological change that implement conceptual 
metaphor theory, see id. at 138-48 (evaluating conceptual metaphors in internet law with a particular 
focus on file-sharing and piracy); JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 78, 133 (2001) (discussing 
several metaphors in copyright law, including the quid-pro-quo and housebreaking metaphor); 
Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Common Law Property Metaphors on the Internet: The Real Problem with the 
Doctrine of Cybertrespass, 12 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L.R. 265 (2006) (analyzing common law 
property metaphors in the development of the doctrine of cybertrespass); Ryan Calo, Robots as Legal 
Metaphors, 30 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 209 (2016) (examining the metaphor of the robot in the judicial 
imagination); Glenn Cohen & Jonathan H. Blavin, Gore, Gibson, and Goldsmith: The Evolution of 
Internet Metaphors in Law and Commentary, 16 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 265, 268 (2002) (exploring the 
use of metaphors of the internet, focusing on three metaphors in particular: the information 
superhighway, cyberspace, and the internet as “real” space); Michael Froomkin, The Metaphor is the 
Key: Cryptography, the Clipper Chip, and the Constitution, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 709 (1995) (using 
conceptual metaphor theory to analyze the constitutionality of encryption regulations); Kristen 
Jakobsen Osenga, The Internet Is Not a Super Highway: Using Metaphors to Communicate Information 
and Communications Policy, 3 J. INFO. POL’Y 30 (2013) (discussing how metaphors influence our 
information policy preferences and advocating for the metaphor of the internet as an ecosystem); 
Robert Reilly, Mapping Legal Metaphors in Cyberspace: Evolving the Underlying Paradigm, 16 J. 
MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 579, 580 (1998) (arguing that the web should be viewed as 
an organic entity); Alfred C. Yen, Western Frontier or Feudal Society? Metaphors and Perceptions of 
Cyberspace, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1207 (2002) (arguing that the internet should be analyzed using 
a metaphor of feudal society). 
 
2019] Copyright and Reality 1281 
reality without explicit reference to it and analyzes what these linguistic 
choices reveal about the conceptual role of reality in copyright law. 
II. REALITY METAPHORS 
Since the role of reality in copyright law lies just below the surface, we 
must explore how courts indirectly describe or confront reality. This 
Section will use several key metaphors to construct a conceptual model of 
reality in copyright law. 
First, the metaphors of reality-is-original, reality-is-subject-matter, 
reality-is-commons, and representation-is-copy reveal that copyright law is 
centrally concerned with reality as a referent for an author’s creative work. 
In other words, reality is relevant to copyright law as that thing which is 
copied. The case of Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co. teaches that 
whether reality is not created by any author (what this Comment will term 
“public domain reality”) or created by some author (what this Comment will 
term “externally created reality”) is analytically significant to the issues of 
both originality and infringement.53 However, the nature of the work that 
uses reality as a referent—i.e., whether it is a simple representation or a 
simulation—has blurred this distinction in the area of highly accurate, 
reality-reproducing technologies. 
Second, the reality-is-facts-in-the-world metaphor tells us that reality is 
understood to be actual and objective. More importantly, however, it 
highlights the central importance of perspective when defining reality for 
purposes of copyright law. Put simply, reality must be defined from the 
perspective of the next creator. Reality thus includes those things that have no 
human author (public domain reality) and things are not authored by the next 
creator, but have some other human author (externally created reality). 
However, it does not include expression authored by the next creator (what 
this Comment terms “new expression”). 
A. Reality-is-Original; Representation-is-Copy 
Understanding the divergent ways in which copyright law understands 
reality and representations of reality is an essential first step in sketching 
our ontology. Indeed, the very first line drawn in our conceptual model is 
between reality qua reality and representations of reality. This essential 
distinction is best understood by analyzing the reality-is-original and 
representation-is-copy metaphors. 
 
53 See infra Section II.A. 
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In Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., the Supreme Court 
considered the copyrightability of an illustration of circus performers drawn 
from life.54 Justice Holmes, writing for the Court, concluded that the 
illustrations were copyrightable.55 Unsurprisingly, Holmes never explicitly 
referred to reality in the opinion. Instead, he conjured the idea of reality by 
referring to actual groups, visible things, and later, nature.56 Categorically 
rejecting any legal relevance for the fact that the images might have been 
drawn from life,57 Holmes declared: “It is obvious also that the plaintiff ’s 
case is not affected by the fact . . . that the pictures represent actual 
groups—visible things . . . . Others are free to copy the original. They are not 
free to copy the copy.”58 By the term “the original,” it is a fair inference that 
Holmes was referring of that collection of things that we commonly 
understand to be reality, i.e., actual, visible things.59 
Three important assumptions about the status of reality in copyright law 
are packed into Holmes’ statement: (1) reality is actual and visible, (2) reality 
is “the original”, and (3) a representation of reality is a “copy.” The idea of 
reality as actual and visible is deep-rooted in our assumptions about the world 
around us, but nonetheless controversial even in the realm of copyright law. 
Section II.B dwells further on the analytical significance of understanding 
reality as actual and visible by exploring the reality-is-facts metaphor. 
However, the distinction between reality and a representation of reality 
underlying the second and third assumptions is a fundamental one. In 
Bleistein, Holmes made this distinction implicitly by using the terms 
“original” and “copy.” Reality is the original, i.e., the thing that is copied. The 
representation is the copy, defined by Holmes as “the personal reaction of an 
individual upon nature.”60 For Holmes, the validity of the metaphor was 
 
54 188 U.S. 239, 242 (1903). 
55 Id. at 252. 
56 Id. at 249 (“[T]he pictures represent actual groups—visible things.”). 
57 Id. (“[The illustrations] seem from the testimony to have been composed from hints or 
description, not from sight of a performance. But even if they had been drawn from [] life, that fact 
would not deprive them of protection.”). 
58 Id. at 249-50 (emphasis added). 
59 See, e.g., BRAINARD, supra note 7, at 203, n.1 (2017) (“‘[R]eal’ historically refers to what exists 
independently of our minds. Used in this historical sense, the term distinguishes naturally occurring 
things and properties . . . from creations of our minds . . . .”). That Holmes had the concept of 
reality in mind here is also bolstered by the three cases he cited in support of his reasoning, which 
each involve representations of things that we commonly think of as components of reality: 
geographical features and locations. Kelly v. Morris (1866) 1 LR Eq. 697 (Eng.); Morris v. Wright 
(1870) 5 Ch. App. 279 (Eng.); Blunt v. Patten, 3 F. Cas. 763 (S.D.N.Y. 1828) (No. 1580). For further 
discussion of these cases, see infra subsection II.A.1. 
60 Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 250; see also 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining “copies” as “material objects . . . in 
which a work is fixed . . . and from which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise 
communicated”); infra subsection II.B.2 (complicating the copy). 
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obvious and needed no further analysis: reality-is-original, while 
representation-is-copy. 
While Holmes defined what he meant by a copy he did not explicitly 
address the meaning of “the original.”61 The term “the original,” as we 
commonly use it, can include both created and non-created things. The 
Oxford English Dictionary, for example, defines the term as “[d]esignating 
the thing, as a document, text, picture, etc., from which another is copied or 
reproduced.”62 On this view, the original is the referent. 
By his sweeping statement that individuals are “free to copy the 
original,” it is clear that Holmes was using “the original” in Bleistein to refer 
only to non-created things.63 If he considered “the original” to include 
created things—things that might be protected by copyright law—his 
statement would be a radical invitation for infringement. This Comment 
refers to that realm of things that Holmes considered to be the relevant 
referent—those aspects of reality that are not created by any human 
author—as “public domain reality.” 
Importantly, Holmes used terms that are familiar and fundamental in 
copyright law to denote the distinction between reality and representation. 
In order to understand the target domain of “pictures represent[ing] actual 
groups,—visible things,”64 Holmes referred to the more familiar source 
domain of copyright doctrine regarding copying. Indeed, each of the three 
cases to which Holmes cited to support his proposition—Blunt v. Patten, 
Morris v. Wright, and Kelly v. Morris—pivots on copyright doctrine regarding 
copied works. The first subsection begins by examining the target domain of 
public domain reality through exploring Holmes’ source domain of case law 
on copied works. These cases expose the analytical significance of 
distinguishing between the original and the copy for the doctrines of both 
originality and infringement. And through an underlying reality-is-commons 
metaphor, these cases reveal a normative understanding of public domain 
reality as a freely accessible, shared referent for creators. 
The second subsection refines and complicates the meaning of the “copy” 
through introducing the concept of simulation and the potentially 
problematic blurring between the original and the copy that may occur in 
such highly accurate representations of reality. And the final subsection 
discusses the reality-is-subject-matter and originality-is-variation conceptual 
metaphors in case studies of highly accurate, reality reproducing technologies 
such as photography, 3-D modeling, and scanning. These cases reveal that the 
 
61 Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 250. 
62 Original, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2004). 
63 Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 249. 
64 Id. at 249. 
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distinction between noncreated and created reality as referent has vital 
analytical significance for copyright law. In addition, these case studies 
highlight how this critical distinction has become lost in the muddle of case 
law on derivative works and the judicial preference for inaccuracy and 
variation in representations of reality. Through these intertwining 
metaphors, we begin to build our ontology of reality. 
1. Reality-is-Commons 
Although the case law of copying may seem a curious source domain for 
reality, it exposes the core analytical significance of the nature of the referent 
in copyright law. The issue at hand in each case cited by Holmes in Bleistein 
in support of his reality-is-original and representation-is-copy metaphors was 
whether the defendant copied reality or copied the plaintiff ’s preexisting 
representation of reality. Blunt v. Patten involved the alleged copying of a 
chart of the eastern coast of the United States,65 while two English cases, Kelly 
v. Morris and Morris v. Wright, involved alleged copying of directories of 
London homes and businesses.66 The core proposition underlying each case 
was that there cannot be impermissible copying of public domain reality, but 
there can be impermissible copying of a representation of public domain 
reality. In Blunt v. Patten, for example, the Southern District of New York 
stressed that public domain reality is a freely accessible referent for creators: 
[T]he natural objects from which the charts are made are open to the examination 
of all, and any one has a right to survey and make a chart . . . . A right, in such 
a subject, is violated only when another copies from the chart of him who has 
secured the copyright . . . .67  
In other words, a creator may freely use public domain reality as a referent 
without risking infringement. The court in Morris v. Wright even more 
forcefully stressed that infringement requires copying of a work: “[T]he true 
definition of ‘copyright’ is the sole right of multiplying copies. That, of 
course, means that you must not copy with or without colourable alterations. 
That is a general definition of copyright.”68 
This source domain of copying lays bare the analytical significance of 
Holmes classifying the relevant referent as public domain reality.69 There is 
 
65 3 F. Cas. 763, 763 (S.D.N.Y. 1828) (No. 1580). 
66 Kelly v. Morris (1866) 1 LR Eq. 696 at 696-97; Morris v. Wright (1870) 5 Ch App. 279 at 279-80. 
67 3 F. Cas. at 764-65 (emphasis added). 
68 5 Ch App. at 284. 
69 In the directory cases, this is arguably copying of facts. For further discussion of the 
reality-is-fact metaphor, see infra Section II.B. 
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independent creation and therefore also likely originality70 where the 
original (the referent, i.e., the thing that is copied) is public domain reality. 
There is illicit copying, and thus no originality and possibly infringement,71 
where the original is already a copy of public domain reality.72 In other 
words, precisely how we classify the referent has immense consequences for 
determining whether a work is protected by copyright law or infringing 
another author’s copyright rights. 
Why did Holmes identify public-domain-reality-as-referent as a 
special case where copying is entirely permissible? The answer lies in the 
singular nature of public domain reality: its nonexclusivity and 
accessibility to subsequent creators to use as a referent for independent 
creation. The geographic features of the east coast of the United States 
and the locations of London homes and business are “common objects of 
information”73 and “open to the examination of all.”74 Holmes’s focus on 
the parts of reality that are not created by anyone, and thus plainly part 
of the public domain, reveals a normative underbelly to the judicial view 
of reality. It is natural to view reality as accessible, free, and open to all. 
In this view, reality-is-commons. 
The concept of the commons is understood differently by different 
scholars—for example, as the antithesis of private property, property from 
which users cannot be excluded, or property with no restrictions on its use.75 
Broadly, however, the commons functions as “the law’s primary safeguard of 
the raw material that makes authorship possible.”76 
 
70 The originality doctrine of copyright law requires that: (1) the work must be the 
independent creation of an author, as opposed to being copied from other works; and (2) the 
work must possess some minimal degree of creativity. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 
499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991). 
71 Infringement in copyright law requires proof of actual copying. Id. at 361. 
72 See Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 102-03 (2d Cir. 1951) (“All that 
is needed to satisfy both the Constitution and the statute is that the ‘author’ contributed something 
more than a ‘merely trivial’ variation, something recognizably ‘his own.’ Originality in this context 
‘means little more than a prohibition of actual copying.’” (footnote omitted)). The baseline 
originality requirement was predominant at the time of Bleistein, but was later heightened in Feist. 
73 Kelly v. Morris (1866) 1 LR Eq. 696 at 701. 
74 Blunt v. Patten, 3 F. Cas. 763, 764 (S.D.N.Y. 1828) (No. 1580). 
75 See, e.g., Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from 
Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 672-73 (1998) (surveying the meaning of the “commons” 
in property law); A. Samuel Oddi, The Tragicomedy of the Public Domain in Intellectual Property 
Law, 25 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1, 8 n.13 (2002) (“The literature has not produced a 
consistent definition of ‘public domain’ or ‘intellectual commons’ (sometime[s] ‘intangible 
commons’) or their interrelationship, if any.”). 
76 Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 967 (1990). 
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Indeed, the intersection of the sweat-of-the-brow rationale for copyright 
protection (firmly rejected in the United States after the Feist77 case in 1991) 
and the reality-is-original metaphor even more firmly underpins this 
underlying reality-is-commons metaphor. The characteristics of public 
domain reality that spring from the reality-is-commons metaphor are 
particularly important in a labor-based (“sweat-of-the-brow”) justification for 
copyright law. The sweat-of-the-brow justification sees copyright as 
rewarding the labor of individuals who independently create works while 
punishing the laziness of copiers. In all three cases cited by Holmes for his 
proposition that artists are free to copy public domain reality, the courts noted 
that copying is particularly egregious when public domain reality is such an 
accessible and freely available source for independent creation. As noted by 
the court in Kelly: 
[W]hen there are certain common objects of information which must, if 
described correctly, be described in the same words, a subsequent compiler is 
bound to set about doing for himself that which the first compiler has done. 
In the case of a road-book, he must count the milestones for himself. In the 
case of a map of a newly-discovered island . . . he must go through the whole 
process of triangulation just as if he had never seen any former map, and, 
generally, he is not entitled to take one word of the information previously 
published without independently working out the matter for himself, so as to 
arrive at the same result from the same common sources of information, and 
the only use that he can legitimately make of a previous publication is to 
verify his own calculations and results when obtained. So in the present case 
the Defendant could not take a single line of the Plaintiff ’s Directory for the 
purpose of saving himself labour and trouble in getting his information.78 
While sweat-of-the-brow is no longer valid in the United States, the 
idea of reality as an especially accessible part of the commons—as a 
nonexclusive resource for subsequent creators to use for their own 
independent creation—lies at the heart of the ontology of reality in 
copyright law. This Comment revisits the reality-is-commons metaphor and 
its implications for new reality technologies in Part IV. 
Thus, our conceptual model begins with an acknowledgement that reality 
is not the same as a representation of reality. At least part of our concept of 
 
77 That an author labored to create her work is irrelevant to determining creativity; 
evidence of creativity must come from the work itself. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 
499 U.S. 340, 364 (1991).  
78 1 LR Eq. at 701-02; see also Blunt, 3 F. Cas. at 763-65 (referring to “fair fruit of original labor” 
and framing the issue with a focus on labor: the plaintiff “charges the defendant with having availed 
himself of the information thus acquired by the labor, and at the expense of the complainant in the 
publication of his chart”). 
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reality includes things not created by any human author, which this Comment 
refers to as public domain reality.79 Individuals may use public domain reality 
freely as a referent to create copies, and these copies may qualify for copyright 
protection. See Figure 2 for these initial outlines of our conceptual model. 
Figure 2: Reality Includes Things That Were Not Created by Any Human 
Author (Public Domain Reality) 
The reality-is-original and representation-is-copy conceptual metaphors 
are analytically significant because they reveal that the nature of the original 
(i.e., the referent for an author’s creative work) affects whether there is both 
originality and infringement. Copying can be both permissible and illicit, but 
infringement requires illicit copying—the copying of a protectable work. On 
the other hand, originality requires independent creation by an author (i.e. 
the absence of illicit copying). Public domain reality does not contain any 
protectable works because it consists entirely of things with no human author. 
Thus, where the original is public domain reality, any copy will likely be 
deemed a noninfringing, independent creation. 
Our ontology of reality, however, requires further exploration. This 
Comment has referred to copies as including only representations, but that 
notion requires complicating. Copies may include far more than simple 
representations; of particular interest in the context of new reality technologies 
is the concept of copy-as-simulation, which will be discussed further in 
subsection II.A.2. Where the copy is a simulation, we may struggle to 
distinguish between the original and the copy. As a result, we might lose sight 
of whether the relevant referent consists of noncreated or created things.
This failure to appreciate the analytical significance of whether the referent 
is created or noncreated has already appeared in judicial analyses of highly 
accurate technologies post-Bleistein. Courts disfavor highly accurate copies 
without regard to whether the copies are of public domain reality or of other 
79 For discussion of whether reality also includes created things, see infra subsection II.A.3 
and Section II.B.
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works. Subsection II.A.3 explores this conceptual blurring between the 
original and the copy through case studies of photography and 3-D modeling. 
2. Complicating the Copy 
Mediums that mimic reality with a high degree of accuracy have opened 
the door to novel types of copies beyond traditional representations. Thus, 
it would be wise to expand our conception of the copy to include 
simulations as well as representations. This Section is not a reflection of 
current law regarding copyright protection of simulations of reality 
because courts simply have not thoroughly tackled the issue yet. Rather, it 
proposes analyzing copies-as-simulations as a useful way to think about 
how the reality-is-original and representation-is-copy conceptual 
metaphors may apply in the case of new reality technologies. While the 
distinction between the original and the copy has great analytical 
significance in copyright law, where the copy is a simulation (and as the 
next subsection analyzes, even where the copy is merely highly accurate), 
that distinction becomes troublingly muddled. 
In Bleistein, Holmes defined a copy of reality as “the personal reaction of 
an individual upon nature.”80 Under this view, the copy is infused with 
subjectivity as the author imprints the referent with an element of her 
personality. This definition of a copy, however, was formulated in the 
particular context of a copy of public domain reality (which includes, among 
other things, “nature”). More broadly, the Copyright Act defines a copy as a 
material object that is fixed in a tangible medium.81 To be protected by 
copyright law, a copy must also be an expression, i.e. it must be produced by 
a human author.82 Notably, a copy need not be copied in the sense of having a 
referent (although, practically, most works do have some referent).83 
Now for the complicating. Where reality is the original, the precise type 
of copy may change the relationship between that copy and the original. 
Because the purpose of this Comment is to relate the ontology of reality 
generally to new reality technologies, I focus here on a particular type of copy: 
the simulation.84 At its heart, a simulation is simply a type of copy that seeks 
 
80 Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 250. 
81 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (stating that a work is fixed when it may be “perceived, reproduced, 
or otherwise communicated for a period of more than a transitory duration.”). 
82 KOEPSELL, supra note 13, at 114 (“All expressions share one property: they originate from 
purposeful human action.”). 
83 See infra Part IV (discussing the essentially derivative nature of creativity). 
84 The word simulation is derived from the Latin simulare, which means “to copy.” Andrew 
Wernick, Simulation, in THE BAUDRILLARD DICTIONARY 199 (Richard G. Smith ed., 2010). 
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to imitate its original very closely.85 To discuss the concept of the simulation 
and its place in our ontology of reality, this Comment borrows from the 
conceptual model created by media theorist Jean Baudrillard.86 Baudrillard 
extensively theorized the nature of the simulation and argued that we should 
understand simulation in three orders: (1) the representation; (2) the 
simulation; and (3) hyperreality. At each stage, the copy becomes increasingly 
indistinguishable from its original. 
In the first order of simulation, the representation is clearly based on 
reality and there is no confusion between the original and the copy.87 The 
original is the unmistakable referent for the simulation. A first order 
simulation is the type of copy that we are most familiar with and how we 
would currently classify most of the works protected by copyright law. 
In the second order of simulation, the copy is still based on reality, but 
the borders between original and copy become blurred.88 As an imaginative 
example, Baudrillard described a map that has a one-to-one relationship with 
the territory it depicts such that it covers the territory exactly: 
 
85 See Simulation, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2004)(defining simulation as a 
“false assumption or display, a surface resemblance or imitation, of something.”). 
86 Baudrillard used the concept of the simulation primarily for the purposes of sociocultural 
criticism, with a particular focus on the role of media in creating power structures in society. For 
Baudrillard, the simulation was a way for understanding historical and cultural devices of social 
control. William Pawlett, Simulcra & Simulcrum, in THE BAUDRILLARD DICTIONARY 197 (Richard 
G. Smith ed., 2010). Primarily, Baudrillard understood simulation as a social process. See generally, 
CHARLES LEVIN, JEAN BAUDRILLARD: A STUDY IN CULTURAL METAPHYSICS 184 (1996). 
Baudrillard’s writing also introduces concepts of metaphysical truth and realness—both issues, as 
noted in Part I, that we are not concerned with here. Baudrillard, for example, argued that the idea of 
the real was a cultural construction in post-modern times. Mike Game, Hyper-Reality, in THE 
BAUDRILLARD DICTIONARY 95 (Richard G. Smith ed., 2010). For Baudrillard, the metaphysical idea 
of the “real” had disappeared completely because the virtual and real had become inextricably mixed. 
Andrew Warnick, Real, in THE BAUDRILLARD DICTIONARY 178-79 (Richard G. Smith ed., 2010). 
However, this Comment cites Baudrillard only for his bare conceptual model of the three orders of 
simulation, not for his broader sociocultural theories. This conceptual model provides a helpful 
structure for thinking about how the current ontology of reality in copyright law might approach new 
reality technologies, which are at their cores, simulations. See infra Part III (providing an illustrative 
example of this Comment’s conceptual model using Baudrillard’s three orders of simulation). While 
Baudrillard’s broader theories are undoubtedly controversial, this Comment does not need to become 
entangled in the broader controversy in order to find his conceptual model of simulation useful. See, 
e.g. Denis Dutton, Bookmarks, 14 PHILOSOPHY AND LITERATURE 232, 235 (1990) (“[A]lmost 
everything Baudrillard says is either trite or somehow—vaguely or baldly—false.”); Patricia Cohen, 
Jean Baudrillard, 77, Critic and Theorist of Hyperreality, Dies, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 7, 2007), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/07/books/07baudrillard.html (“Like other postmodernists with 
whom he was often associated . . . he was frequently criticized as obscure.”). 
87 See RICHARD J. LANE, JEAN BAUDRILLARD 84 (2009) (“A first-order simulation would be 
where the representation of the real (say, a novel, a painting or a map) is obviously just that: an 
artificial representation.”). 
88 Id. at 84 (“A second-order simulation . . . blurs the boundaries between reality and representation.”). 
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If once we were able to view the Borges fable89 in which the cartographers of 
Europe draw up a map so detailed that it ends up covering the territory 
exactly . . . as the most beautiful allegory of simulation, this fable has now 
come full circle for us, and possesses nothing but the discrete charm of 
second-order simulacra.90 
This map entirely covers the geographic reality underneath, which only 
peeks through in the map’s tattered, remote edges.91 The key difference 
between a representation and a simulation lies in the fact that a representation 
reflects reality, while a second order simulation masks it.92 
Augmented reality technologies are of particular interest as second order 
simulations, as they mix “the completely real with the simulated or synthetic 
[by projecting] images and information in the wearer’s line of vision.”93 
Mixed reality technologies—a specific type of augmented reality—are able to 
retain specific knowledge of an individual’s world in order to keep stable the 
location of digital objects: 
In mixed reality, a user can navigate through the real world and a virtual 
environment seamlessly, and simultaneously. The virtual objects are 
accurately positioned in the real-world space. If one moves towards an object 
it will get larger and vice versa. And when one moves around it, the virtual 
objects are seen from different angles and perspectives—just like the behavior 
of real objects.94 
The ability of new reality technologies to blur the lines between the real 
and the simulated is one of their core claims and attractions. As these 
technologies become more common, their users may lose the ability to 
distinguish between public domain reality and simulation in their everyday 
lives.95 Creators have already started to imagine how this mixed world might 
appear to a user.96 For example, the animator and futurist Keiichi Matsuda 
 
89 For this example, Baudrillard draws from a one-paragraph short story from the Argentine 
postmodernist writer Jorge Luis Borges. Jorge Lius Borges, On Exactitude in Science, in COLLECTED 
FICTIONS 325 (trans. Andrew Hurley, 1999). 
90 JEAN BAUDRILLARD, SIMULACRA AND SIMULATION 1 (Sheila Glaser trans., University of 
Michigan Press 1994) (1981). 
91 Id. 
92 Id. at 6. 
93 PEDDIE, supra note 12, at 2. 
94 Id. at 23. 
95 See Joshua Rothman, Are We Already Living in Virtual Reality?, NEW YORKER (Apr. 2, 2018), 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/04/02/are-we-already-living-in-virtual-reality 
[https://perma.cc/R2XM-5XZA] (“On some level, the brain doesn’t know the difference between 
real reality and virtual reality.”). 
96 Cf. Joanna Stern, Augmented Reality Will Put the Internet Everywhere, WALL STREET J. 
(Oct. 22, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/augmented-reality-will-put-the-internet-everywhere-
1540216800 (attempting to explain her experience testing the Magic Leap AR headset); Magic Leap, 
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created a video depicting an augmented reality world where the viewer’s sight 
is cluttered with advertisements, games, and messages.97 There, only a small 
slice of the physical world peeks through.98 This is the second order of 
simulation promised by new reality technologies. 
In the third order of simulation, a new type of reality is born. Reality 
becomes hyperreality, which is itself based on a simulation.99 Public domain 
reality, as we know it, disappears as a referent: 
With first and second-order simulation, the real still exists, and we 
measure the success of simulation against the real . . . . [T]he model now 
generates . . . ‘hyperreality’—that is, a world without a real origin. So with 
third order simulation we no longer even have the real as part of the 
equation.100 
Here, our reality is itself a simulation, and that simulation is based on 
another simulation, which is based on another simulation, and so on.101 In this 
kind of copy, the copy is “not merely indistinguishable from what it copies but 
. . . the very distinction between copy and original disappears.”102 The role of 
 
Magic Leap, Demo: Waking Up with Mixed Reality, YOUTUBE (Apr. 19, 2016), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GmdXJy_IdNw (demonstrating the possibilities of “mixed 
reality” technologies); Sir Peter Jackson’s Studio Reveals Augmented Reality Demo, BBC NEWS (July 
29 2017), https://www.bbc.com/news/av/technology-40656678/sir-peter-jackson-s-studio-reveals-
augmented-reality-demo (demonstrating the possibilities for AR as a medium of storytelling). 
97 Keiichi Matsuda, HYPER-REALITY, YOUTUBE (May 19, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=YJg02ivYzSs; see also Sarah Gailey, An Augmented Reality, ATLANTIC (Dec. 14, 2018), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2018/12/short-story-about-choice-age-wearables/577732 
[https://perma.cc/FZ23-5C2F] (exploring a troublesome future with AR eyewear); Robot Genius, 
Sight, VIMEO (July 24, 2012), https://vimeo.com/46304267 (imagining a world in which one can 
experience augmented reality via contact lenses). That we could live our daily lives with such a 
perspective is not merely science fiction. Augmented reality eyeglasses are, of course, already on the 
market. And Samsung, Google, and others are in the process of developing augmented reality contact 
lenses. Doug Bolton, Samsung Patents Design for ‘Smart’ Augmented Reality Contact Lenses, 
INDEPENDENT (April 6, 2016), https://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/
samsung-smart-contact-lenses-patent-a6971766.html [https://perma.cc/GCY8-7W8Q]; Tom Anstey, 
Sony Files Patent for Augmented Reality Contact Lens, CLADNEWS (Feb. 14 2017), 
http://www.cladglobal.com/CLADnews/architecture-design/AR-VR-technology-Sony-contact-
lenses-virtual-reality-augmented-reality-visitor-attractions/330285 [https://perma.cc/ZNP8-ZA7Q]. 
98 Matsuda, supra note 97. 
99 See JEAN BAUDRILLARD, SELECTED WRITINGS 149 (Mark Poster ed., 2001) (“[R]eality has 
passed over into the play of reality . . . .”); LANE, supra note 87, at 98 (“[T]he hyperreal [is] where 
a kind of virtual reality is produced by models of what we want reality to be.”). 
100 LANE, supra note 87, at 84. 
101 Baudrillard believed that we are already living in a hyperreality because of the prevalence of 
simulations in the media. Id. at 89 (noting that Baudrillard viewed the post-modern world as being a 
“society of surfaces, performativity and a fragmentation or fracturing of rationality”). Once again, the 
socio-cultural aspect of Baudrillard’s theory is not relevant to our legal ontology of reality. 
102 Andrew Wernick, Simulation, in the THE BAUDRILLARD DICTIONARY 199 (Richard 
G. Smith ed., 2010). 
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public domain reality as a referent is no longer relevant to the model, as only 
created reality persists as a referent.103 Extending the example of the Borges 
fable discussed above, Baudrillard explains that in hyperreality, “[t]he territory 
no longer precedes the map”—instead, the map “precedes the territory.”104 
In summary, the relationship between the original and the copy change due 
to the nature of the simulation, becoming increasingly blurred as the simulation 
becomes more accurate. For our purposes, the idea of hyperreality represents a 
world in which individual perceptions of reality are teeming with created 
things. In such a world, all of the referents for creative expression are 
themselves created.105 It is important that such a world factors into our 
conceptual model so that we can evaluate how well the current ontology of 
reality would balance the needs of progress and protection in an entirely created 
reality. This Comment uses Baudrillard’s three orders of simulation in section 
III as a structural basis for illustrating how the proposed conceptual model of 
reality might function for varying levels of simulation. Section IV discusses the 
potential implications for copyright protection of new reality technologies. 
The blurring of the original and the copy, so pronounced in the 
simulation, has troubling analytical repercussions. Even outside of the realm 
of the simulation, this blurring has appeared when courts analyze 
technologies that merely reproduce reality with a high degree of accuracy. 
3. Reality-is-Subject-Matter; Originality-is-Variation 
The reality-is-original and representation-is-copy metaphors establish 
that the difference between the original and the copy is essential to 
understanding the ontology of reality in copyright law. Importantly, we must 
distinguish between reality itself and a copy of reality because it is only the 
copy that can obtain copyright protection. In addition, identifying whether 
the original is public domain reality or itself created is essential to 
determining infringement. However, there has been a conceptual blurring 
between the original and the copy in case law on the question of originality 
in heavily reality-dependent technologies. 
The first subsection introduces the reality-is-subject-matter and 
originality-is-variation metaphors through case law on photography, where 
highly accurate photographs are perceived as less creative because of the close 
 
103 See, e.g., John Carlin, Culture Vultures: Artistic Appropriation and Intellectual Property Law, 13 
COLUM.-VLA J.L & ARTS 103, 111 (1988) (“The referent in post-Modern art is no longer ‘nature’ 
but the closed system of fabricated signs that make up our environment.”). 
104 BAUDRILLARD, supra note 90, at 1. 
105 See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, Reality as Artifact: From Feist to Fair Use, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 93, 100 (1992) (“[M]uch of the modern environment is a product of deliberate human 
creation—our world is constituted more by buildings and landscape architecture than by natural 
woods and water—and that art will address as its object much that is itself art.”). 
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kinship of subject matter with reality. Because the copy so closely resembles 
the original, the two are conflated or merged. 
The second subsection further explores the conflation between copy and 
original by analyzing judicial reactions to other highly accurate technologies 
such as scanning and 3-D modeling. By broadly analogizing these 
technologies to photography, courts have perpetuated the conceptual blurring 
between original and copy. Perhaps even more problematically, courts have 
blended the specialized originality standard for derivative works (copies 
based on copies) with the general Feist originality standard (that applies, for 
instance, to copies based on public domain reality). This has further bolstered 
the originality-is-variation metaphor for highly accurate technologies, leading 
to the absurd result of some courts requiring a “distinguishable variation” in 
hand-drawn illustrations of public domain reality. 
a. Photography 
The invention of photography in the early nineteenth century marked a 
seismic shift in both aesthetics and technology.106 Photography, however, was 
initially embraced for its documentary objectivity rather than its artistic 
possibilities.107 The uncanny ability of photography to precisely reproduce 
reality was particularly threatening during an era in which many fine artists 
strove for mimesis in their art.108 Those who argued that photography was 
fundamentally not art stressed its mechanical nature: what was possibly artistic 
in an exact reproduction of reality?109 
 
106 For far more extensive discussions of the history of photography in copyright law, see 
generally Teresa M. Bruce, In the Language of Pictures: How Copyright Law Fails to Adequately Account 
for Photography, 15 W. VA. L. REV. 93 (2012); Christine Haight Farley, The Lingering Effects of Copyright’s 
Response to the Invention of Photography, 65 U. PITT. L. REV. 385 (2004); Justin Hughes, The 
Photographer’s Copyright—Photograph as Art, Photograph as Database, 25 HARV. J. L. & TECH 339 (2012). 
107 See Farley, supra note 106, at 389 (“[P]hotographs were seen as inscrutable conveyers of 
truth.”); see also CHARLES BAUDELAIRE, THE SALON OF 1859 (1859), reprinted in THE MIRROR OF 
ART 219, 230 (Jonathan Mayne ed., trans., 1955) (pleading for his readers to reject photography as 
an art form, but accepting it as the “secretary and clerk of whoever needs an absolute factual 
exactitude in his profession—up to that point nothing could be better [than photography]”). Louis 
Daugerre, the inventor of the daguerreotype, advertised that “[t]he daguerreotype is not merely an 
instrument which serves to draw nature . . . [it] gives her the power to reproduce herself.” Farley, 
supra note 106, at 386 (quoting SUSAN SONTAG, ON PHOTOGRAPHY 188 (1978)). 
108 Bruce, supra note 106, at 101 (“For centuries, a painter’s goal had been to reproduce reality. 
But the camera could reproduce reality better than a painting, even in the hands of an amateur; thus, 
painters and their patrons were threatened by the new device.”). 
109 Alphonse de Lamartine, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs (and also a Romantic 
poet), wrote in 1848: “It is because of the servility of photography that I am fundamentally 
contemptuous of this chance invention which will never be an art but which plagarises [sic.] nature 
by means of optics . . . . The photographer will never replace the painter, one is a Man, the other a 
machine.” Farley, supra note 106, at 418 n.125 (quoting VI ALPHONSE DE LAMARTINE, COURS 
FAMILIER DE LITERATURE ENTRETIENS SUR LEOPALD ROBERT 140 (1858)) (emphasis added). 
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And for several decades, the evidentiary role of photographs dominated 
the artistic. The reality-is-subject-matter metaphor was predominant;110 as 
Susan Sontag notes, photographs were seen as “miniatures of reality.”111 The 
reality-is-subject-matter metaphor emerged: the subject matter of a 
photograph was reality, plain and simple. 
Photographs were not included in the Copyright Act until thirty-nine 
years after the first photograph was taken, and the originality of photographs 
was not addressed by the Supreme Court for another nineteen years.112 At 
that point, the Court in Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony determined 
that photographs were, indeed, protectable.113 Proponents of photography as 
an art form achieved this legal victory through what has been called the 
pictorial rationale. The way for photographers to obtain artistic legitimacy, 
under this rationale, was to imitate traditionally protected pictures—namely 
paintings.114 In the photography-is-painting metaphor, photographers found 
a powerful source domain to explain the creative nature of photography while 
garnering artistic merit and acceptance. 
The transfer of knowledge from source to target domain, however, 
overwhelmed the very realism that distinguished photographs from other 
mediums. The pictorial rationale for artistic legitimacy snubbed the idea that 
photographs were objective and accurate representations of reality. 
Photographers recoiled against the reality-is-subject-matter metaphor and 
strove to make their photographs look like paintings—or in other words, like 
traditional representations of reality, not reality itself.115 To achieve this, 
photographers posed their subjects preshutter, and distorted or manipulated 
 
110 Later courts and commentators have bolstered the reality-is-subject-matter metaphor by 
arguing that in the context of visual arts, the idea/expression dichotomy is not useful because the 
idea is coextensive with the subject matter. See, e.g., Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co., 377 F. Supp. 
2d 444, 461 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (“In the context of photography, the idea/expression distinction is not 
useful or relevant.”). Under this view, the idea is a description of the subject matter, which is 
coextensive with the reality depicted in the photograph. Id. 
111 Susan Sontag, in her influential treatise on photography, explained the common 
understanding of photography as truth-bearing: “[p]hotographed images do not seem to be 
statements about the world so much as pieces of it, miniatures of reality that anyone can make or 
acquire.” Sontag, quoted in Hughes supra note 106, at 344-45. 
112 Bruce, supra note 106, at 96 (noting that Congress’s list of photographs in the Copyright 
Act was not challenged by litigants in the Supreme Court until “some twenty years later”). 
113 111 U.S. 53, 56-61 (1884) (addressing the originality question and holding that photographs 
were of sufficient originality, authorship, and intellectual creation to be protectable by Congress). 
114 See Farley, supra note 106, at 417 (referring to this approach as “picture-making, as 
opposed to picture-taking”). 
115 Bruce, supra note 106, at 102. As Bruce notes, these paintings were themselves distorted 
representations of reality. See id. at 103 (“They were contrived, not candid, representations of 
life . . . . [P]ainters were striving for, and making claims to, naturalism, but faking it.”). 
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the photographs postshutter.116 To be artistic, the argument went, the 
photograph must not look particularly real. Photographic representations of 
reality could either be: (1) manipulated or mediated, and thus artistic and 
original; or (2) unmediated, and thus accurate and unoriginal.117 In 
photography, all representations of reality were not equal. 
This pictorial ethic was not challenged until the close of the century 
with the emergence of the “straight photography” movement,118 and thus, 
the Supreme Court first encountered the issue of originality in 
photographs during a period in which the pictorial ethic was 
predominant.119 In other words, the Supreme Court first confronted the 
issue of originality in photography when the subject matter of photographs 
was principally a staged or composed reality. 
In Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, the Supreme Court addressed 
whether a (now famous) photograph of Oscar Wilde was sufficiently original to 
obtain copyright protection.120 In arguing that photographs were categorically 
not creative enough for copyright protection, the defendant emphasized two 
characteristic aspects of photographic technology: (1) its mechanical nature, and 
(2) its ability to reproduce reality with complete accuracy. Noncommittally, the 
Court accepted the premises of this argument. Yes, the Court conceded, a 
photograph may be entirely unoriginal when it merely “[transfers] to the plate 
the visible representation of some existing object, the accuracy of this representation 
being its highest merit.”121 The Court referred to this as the “ordinary production 
of a photograph,” but refused to decide exactly when photographs became 
merely “ordinary” and thus unoriginal.122 
This equivocation was because the photographer’s production of a 
photograph was, in the Court’s judgment, not ordinary, but artistic, with the 
Court describing it as “useful, new, harmonious, characteristic, and 
graceful.”123 The photograph of Oscar Wilde was sufficiently creative because 
 
116 Early photographers commonly manipulated their photographs postshutter, for example, 
by adding brushstrokes, coloring the image, or developing the photograph in a way that made the 
images dream-like and distorted. Bruce, supra note 106, at 103-04. 
117 See Farley, supra note 106, at 389, 393 (identifying this “contest of meanings” in photography 
as the “battle between photography as art and photography as truth”). 
118 This challenge was also known as the Photo-Secessionist movement, which argued that 
“straight photography”—photography that focused on realism and accuracy—should be accepted as 
art based on its own aesthetic merits. Bruce, supra note 106, at 105-06. 
119 Because of this, although society has become comfortable with accepting straight 
photography as an art form, the law has not caught up. See, e.g., id., at 102 (“[T]he courts have not 
quite figured out how to accommodate straight photographs as highly-expressive works entitled to 
copyright protection as stringent as that afforded to pictorial photographs.”). 
120 111 U.S. 53, 54-55 (1884). 
121 Id. at 59 (emphasis added). 
122 Id. 
123 Id. at 60. 
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the photographer created or composed the subject matter (i.e., the reality). He 
“gave visible form” to “his own original mental conception” by: “posing the 
said Oscar Wilde in front of the camera, selecting and arranging the costume, 
draperies, and other various accessories in said photograph . . . arranging and 
disposing the light and shade, suggesting and evoking the desired expression, 
and . . . [producing] such disposition, arrangement, or representation, made 
entirely by [the photographer] . . .” 124 The photograph was original because 
of Sarony’s selection, coordination, and arrangement of the subject matter.125 
In other words, it was creative precisely because the reality was staged or 
composed by the photographer.126 
Thus, Burrow-Giles distinctly privileged photographs that depicted a 
created or composed reality as garnering greater protection under 
 
124 Id. Farley argues that the court’s finding of originality in “preshutter activities” was an 
important analytical move because it allowed the court to distance the artistic activities from the 
mechanical aspects of photography: 
It is the setting up of the photograph which is artistic and deserving of copyright. 
Beyond the click of the shutter, and incidentally, not including the actual click of the 
shutter, the Court did not conceive of any authorship. In this way, the Court was 
straining to locate authorship away from the [mechanical] box. 
Farley, supra note 106, at 427. In addition, locating originality in preshutter activities allowed 
the accuracy of photography to be maintained. In this view, there is no human interference in the 
mechanical ability of photography to capture exactly the scene in front of it: 
The focus on process is therefore evidence of a certain understanding of photography 
that has persevered to the present: that the photograph is simply a duplication of 
nature unless it is actively constructed. To hold otherwise would be to admit that all 
photographs . . . are constructed by choice. 
Id. at 432. 
125 Note the similarity to the standard for originality in compilations of facts in Feist, wherein 
the Court stated that “[f]acts are never original, so the compilation author can claim originality, if 
at all, only in the way the facts are presented. To that end, the statute dictates that the principal 
focus should be on whether the selection, coordination, and arrangement are sufficiently original to 
merit protection.” 499 U.S. 340, 358 (1991); see also Hughes, supra note 106, at 342 (arguing that “the 
problem of copyright protection for photographs is really the same problem as copyright protection 
for compilations of fact because photographs are, from one perspective, databases”). Reality as fact 
is discussed more in subsection II.B. For a more modern example of originality in the composition 
of the subject matter, see Rogers v. Koons, 751 F. Supp. 474, 477 (2d Cir. 1990). In Rogers, the Second 
Circuit held that a photograph of a couple with a litter of eight puppies was original because the 
photographer posed the subjects: 
It is of course the fact that [the couple’s] German Shepherd produced a litter of eight 
puppies; that the [couple] thought the puppies were cute; and that they asked Rogers 
[the photographer] to photograph them. But the manner in which Rogers arranged 
his subjects and carried out his photographer’s art constitutes a protectible original act 
of expression. 
Id. 
126 See Hughes, supra note 106, at 362 (defining created reality as a “composition [that] exists 
in reality—albeit momentarily”). 
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copyright law. Any other subject matter was simply not creative. The legacy 
of Burrow-Giles is that the more accurately the copy resembled the original 
(where the original is not created by the author), the less creative it is in 
the eyes of the courts; the more the copy diverged from the original, the 
more creative. In other words, creativity-is-variation. This is an example 
of a prototype effect, where one category member is considered to be a 
better example of the central case (here, creativity) than another category 
member.127 In photography, the inaccurate has been considered far more 
creative than the accurate.128 
This judicial preference for inaccurate photographs has been memorialized 
in copyright doctrine. As time went on and the “straight photography” 
aesthetic gained prominence and acceptance, courts had to analyze originality 
in accurate, spontaneous photographs of subject matter that was neither 
composed nor staged.129 The black letter law is that there is no protection for 
 
127 See WINTER, supra note 15, at 85 (explaining the prototype effect through experiments 
where half the subjects were asked to list characteristics average or typical to a category and half 
were asked to list characteristics ideal or definitive of the category). 
128 This tendency to split works into a binary between the creative and the accurate appears 
throughout copyright law. For example, in the context of the fair use analysis, the Supreme Court 
has noted that fictional works are closer to the core of intended copyright protection than factual 
works. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 586 (1994). The Third Circuit, in the 
context of determining the originality of a print of cardinals perched on an apple blossom (an 
example of public domain reality), made its preference for an unrealistic artistic style blatant: 
Moreover, in the world of fine art, the ease with which a copyright may be delineated 
may depend on the artist’s style. A painter like Monet when dwelling upon 
impressions created by light on the façade of the Rouen Cathedral is apt to create a 
work which can make infringement attempts difficult. On the other hand, an artist 
who produces a rendition with photograph-like clarity and accuracy may be hard 
pressed to prove unlawful copying by another who uses the same subject matter and 
the same technique. A copyright in that circumstance may be termed ‘weak,’ since the 
expression and the subject matter converge. In contrast, in the impressionist’s work 
the lay observer will be able to differentiate more readily between the reality of the 
subject matter and the subjective effect of the artist’s work. 
Franklin Mint Corp. v. Nat’l Wildlife Art Exch., 575 F.2d 62, 65 (3d Cir. 1978) (internal citations 
omitted). Here, the court reveals that unrealistic representations are simply easier for judges to 
grapple with when determining questions of infringement. Inaccuracies in representation allow the 
court to determine whether the work was copied from another work or from public domain reality. 
But underlying this passage is a fundamental preference for photographs that resemble painting and 
illustration, the traditional beacons of artistic legitimacy. 
129 See Bruce supra note 106, at 119 (“Today, the art world not only accepts straight 
photography as a legitimate aesthetic vis-à-vis pictorialism, it arguably recognizes it as the 
superior aesthetic.”). Courts have folded photographs of independent reality into copyright 
protection by finding originality in characteristics of photography beyond the composed subject 
matter articulated in Burrow-Giles: originality in rendition and originality in timing. See, e.g., 
Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co., 377 F. Supp. 2d 444, 451-52 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (summarizing that, 
in addition to originality in the creation of the subject matter, a photograph may be original in 
either rendition or timing); Hughes, supra note 106, at 367 (explaining that in a photograph of 
 
1298 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 167: 1269
the subject matter in such photographs: “artists have no copyright in the 
‘reality of [their] subject matter.’”130 It is worth, at this point, pausing to parse 
out this statement conceptually in relation to the reality-is-subject-matter 
metaphor. The statement implies that subject matter includes both reality and 
something else: a non-reality. Burrow-Giles reveals that some subject matter 
does obtain protection: subject matter created or composed by the author. 
Thus, we can parse out the subject matter that is not protected—the reality of 
an author’s subject matter—as that which is not created by the author. This may 
include things that are not created by anyone (public domain reality) and 
things that are created by someone other than the author (what this Comment 
refers to as “externally created reality”). Collectively, this Comment classifies 
both public domain reality and externally created reality as “independent 
reality”—those parts of reality that exist irrespective of the particular author 
or work at hand.131 This Comment uses the term “new expression” to refer to 
those parts of reality that are created by the author at hand, whom this 
Comment terms the “next creator.” Figure 3 shows the addition of these 
categories to our ontology of reality. 
 
Figure 3: The Beginning Outlines of Our Ontology of Reality 
 
In sum, the reality-is-subject-matter conceptual metaphor from 
photography case law reveals that authorship is closely intertwined with how 
independent reality, “[t]he reality does not change at all,” but the selection of ways to render 
the image (including camera angle, lighting, etc.) or selection of timing produces “the particular 
arrangement of the objects in the photograph”).
130 Leigh v. Warner Bros., 212 F.3d 1210, 1214 (11th Cir. 2000) (quoting Franklin Mint Corp. v. 
Nat’l Wildlife Art Exch., 575 F.2d 52, 65 (3d Cir. 1978)). There is only protection for the rendition 
(including such things as choice of angle and lighting) and the timing. This protection has been 
called, variously, thin or porous. 
131 I borrow this term from Hughes, who introduced the concept of “independent reality.”
Hughes, supra note 106, at 367.
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courts analyze the protectability of works that use reality as a referent. 
Where the next creator creates or composes the reality (in other words, 
creates subject matter that is new expression), a court is more likely to find 
creativity and thus originality. Where the reality is independent of the 
author—in other words, where the next creator did not herself create or 
compose the subject matter—courts are far more reluctant to deem the work 
creative. Thus, it is important that our ontology of reality distinguish 
between “new expression” by the next creator and pre-existing expression by 
other authors (externally created reality). 
In modern photography cases, courts have looked outside the subject 
matter to locate originality.132 However, for purposes of our ontology, it is 
nonetheless important to remember that courts privilege inaccurate 
representations of reality over accurate ones. This originality-is-variation 
metaphor, rooted in photography case law, has led to a problematic conceptual 
blurring when applied to other new, highly accurate technologies. Taking the 
mandate from photography that subject matter is not protected unless it is 
somehow manipulated, courts demand inaccuracy even in representations of 
public domain reality. However, from Bleistein, we know that public domain 
reality should be an open and accessible referent for copying. In the words of 
Holmes, creators are “free to copy the original.”133 
Despite the special nature of public domain reality as referent, when 
confronted with highly accurate technologies, courts have imposed a more 
stringent originality standard on representations of public domain reality—one 
that is usually reserved for highly accurate representations of externally created 
reality. Thus, the originality-is-variation metaphor—when taken to the 
extreme—threatens to collapse the essential analytical distinction between 
public domain reality and externally created reality as referent. 
b. 3-D Modeling and Scanning 
As this Comment outlined in the previous subsection, the original, as 
we commonly understand it, may include both cases where the original is 
externally created reality (created by other authors) and cases where the 
original is public domain reality (not created by any author). In copyright 
law, however, there is a specialized originality standard for derivative works 
(copies of externally created reality) where inaccuracy in a copy is 
correlated with originality. Section 101 of the Copyright Act defines “[a] 
‘derivative work’ as a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as 
 
132 See supra notes 129-130 (introducing the concepts of originality in rendition and timing). 
133 188 U.S. 239, 249 (1903). 
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[an] . . . art reproduction . . . or any other form in which a work may be 
recast, transformed, or adapted.”134 
In Alfred Bell & Co. Ltd. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., the Second Circuit 
established the “distinguishable variation” standard for derivative works: a 
reproduction of a work is original if there is a distinguishable variation from 
the work.135 This standard requires some inaccuracy in the reproduction—a 
requirement stemming from the prohibition of the copying of other works in 
the originality standard.136 If exact copying of another work is prohibited, then 
a reproduction of a work must necessarily be inexact in order to be protected. 
Thus, the originality standard for derivative works canonized the originality-
is-variation metaphor into black letter law. 
However, the analytical significance of distinguishing between public 
domain reality as referent and externally created reality as referent has been 
disregarded by several courts when analyzing works that are highly accurate 
representations. Bleistein tells us that reproductions of “actual groups [and] 
visible things” are part of the privileged category of reproductions of public 
domain reality.137 These reproductions are likely independently created and 
do not risk infringement because they do not copy other works. On the other 
hand, a work “which is no more than a copy of the work of another”138 is a 
reproduction of externally created reality, which is treated very differently 
because of the risk of potential infringement and the likelihood that the work 
was not independently created. 
However, as a consequence of the strong prototype effect where accuracy 
in a copy of reality leads it to be considered less creative, courts have conflated 
the originality analysis of a derivative work with the standard originality 
analysis. Considering the centrality of the reality-is-commons conceptual 
metaphor, which tells us that individuals are free to copy any aspects of reality 
 
134 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (emphasis added). 
135 191 F.2d 99, 102-05 (2d Cir. 1951). For the sake of simplicity, this Comment focuses on the 
baseline “distinguishable variation” requirement for originality in derivative works. However, the 
predominant test today is slightly more complicated. See, e.g., Entm’t Research Grp. v. Genesis 
Creative Grp., 122 F.3d 1211, 1220 (9th Cir. 1997) (noting that for a finding of copyright protectability 
“the original aspects of a derivative work must be more than trivial” and “must reflect the degree to 
which [the derivative work] relies on preexisting material and must not in any way affect the scope 
of any copyright protection in that preexisting material”) (quoting Durham Indus. v. Tomy Corp., 
630 F.2d 905, 909 (2d Cir. 1980))). The key takeaway for our purposes is that the majority of courts 
recognize that the originality standard for derivative works is different from—and indeed, more rigorous 
than—the baseline originality standard articulated in Feist. 
136 Recall that the Feist standard for originality requires “independent creation,” i.e., the absence 
of copying. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. This derivative works test can be understood as 
defining further when something is an independent creation as opposed to being copied. 
137 Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 249-50 (1903). 
138 Bridgeman Art Library v. Corel Corp., 25 F. Supp. 2d 421, 427 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) 
[hereinafter “Bridgeman I”]. 
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which have no human author (public domain reality), this blurring is 
troublesome. It leads to works that accurately reproduce public domain 
reality—an open and free referent for creativity—being dismissed as 
unprotectable simply because they are accurate. 
In Bridgeman Art Library v. Corel Corp., for example, the plaintiff created 
photographic reproductions of public domain works of art.139 The Southern 
District of New York held that the images were not original because they were 
“copied from the underlying works without any avoidable addition, alteration, 
or transformation.”140 The court in Bridgeman applied a derivative works 
analysis. And under the facts of this case, rightfully so—the work at issue was 
a copy of a preexisting work, or in other words, a copy of externally created 
reality. However, the court inserted an intent requirement141 into its analysis 
of originality in the derivative work—the photographer must not have 
intended to produce an accurate copy—and did not clearly confine this intent 
requirement to the case of derivative works: 
Certainly anyone who has seen any of the great pieces of photography—for 
example, Alfred Eisenstadt’s classic image of a thrilled sailor exuberantly 
kissing a woman in Times Square on V-J Day, the stirring photograph of U.S. 
Marines raising the American flag atop Mount Surabachi on Iwo Jima, Ansel 
Adams’ work and the portraits of Yousuf Karsh—must acknowledge that 
photographic images of actual people, places and events may be as creative and 
deserving of protection as purely fanciful creations. But one need not deny the 
creativity inherent in the art of photography to recognize that a photograph which 
is no more than a copy of the work of another as exact as science and technology permit 
lacks originality . . . The more persuasive analogy is that of a photocopier.142 
The court began by discussing the (correct) proposition that accurate 
representations of public domain reality may be protected under copyright 
law. After this detour, the court transitioned immediately back into a 
derivative works originality analysis, holding that a photograph which is an 
accurate copy of another work is not protectable. Although the court 
implicitly recognized the distinction between public domain reality and 
externally created reality in this passage, this recognition is cloaked by the 
 
139 Id. at 426. 
140 Id. 
141 Where the photograph “amounts to nothing more than [a] slavish [copy],” the court 
reasoned, it lacks originality. Bridgeman Art Library v. Corel Corp., 36 F. Supp. 2d 191, 196 
(S.D.N.Y. 1999) [hereinafter “Bridgeman II”]. Something is a slavish copy when the intent is to 
reproduce “with absolute fidelity.” Id. at 197. The court stressed that it was appropriate to inquire 
into what “the point of the exercise was.” Id. at 197. 
142 Bridgeman I, 25 F. Supp. 2d at 427 (emphasis added). 
 
1302 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 167: 1269 
overarching comparison of photography case law generally to the photograph 
of externally created reality at issue. 
By using the case law of photography generally to explain the originality 
doctrine in derivative works and its application to highly accurate 
reproductions, the court obscured the fact that photography case law deals 
with reality-as-referent in very different ways depending on its particular 
nature (i.e. whether it is new expression by the next creator, whether it is 
created by another author, or whether it has no human author).143 
Importantly, the derivative works analysis is only applicable to the particular 
situation where a work is a copy of externally created reality, but photography 
case law generally deals with all three types of referents. 
This imprecision in the use of photography as a source domain has been 
perpetuated by later courts. There, the imprecision of using photography 
generally as a source domain has led to a redoubling of the prototype effect 
where accurate works are seen as less deserving of copyright protection. 
Such a redoubling in the prototype effect emerges in the case of 
Meshwerks v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., where the Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals analyzed the protectability of a highly accurate 3-D model of a 
Toyota car. Meshwerks is, at its core, a derivative works case, but follows in 
Bridgeman’s footsteps by blurring derivative works case law with case law 
regarding originality in photography generally. In Meshwerks, we see the 
Tenth Circuit using a broad analogy to photography to justify subjecting all 
highly accurate mediums—without regard to the nature of the referent—to 
the same (heightened) originality standard. The plaintiff, Meshwerks, 
created models of Toyota vehicles for use in Toyota’s advertising.144 
Meshwerks created the models by collecting physical data points from the 
vehicles, using modeling software to generate digital images, and then 
manually fine-tuning them to portray the vehicles as accurately as possible.145 
The defendant in Meshwerks argued that the wire-frame models were 
 
143 See supra subsection II.A.3.a. 
144 Meshwerks, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A. Inc., 528 F.3d 1258, 1260 (10th Cir. 2008). 
Three-dimensional modeling has become an increasingly common medium of expression. See 
generally NEIL GERSHENFELD, DESIGNING REALITY (2017) (imagining a world in which digital 
fabrication of 3-D objects will become the norm). A recent example is “The Other Nefertiti” project. 
In October 2015, artists snuck into the Berlin museum and claimed to scan the bust of Nefertiti with 
a mobile device and reprint it on a 3-D printer. The artists released the data to the world for anyone 
to download and print. Charly Wilder, Swiping a Priceless Antiquity . . . With a Scanner and a 3-D 
Printer, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 1, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/02/arts/design/other-
nefertiti-3d-printer.html; see also Charly Wilder, Nefertiti 3-D Scanning Project in Germany Raises 
Doubts, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 10, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/11/arts/design/nefertiti-3-d-
scanning-project-in-germany-raises-doubts.html (raising doubts as to whether the technology was 
really sufficient for the artists to 3-D scan the bust). 
145 528 F.3d at 1260. 
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unoriginal because all originality was attributable to the Toyota car design, 
which Meshwerks was merely reproducing accurately.146 The court agreed, 
holding that the wire frame models were not the independent creation of an 
author.147 But what is important for our purposes is not the court’s holding, 
but the structure of its reasoning. 
Judge (now Supreme Court Justice) Gorsuch framed his reasoning purely 
in terms of a standard originality analysis, rather than a derivative works 
originality analysis. Indeed, Judge Gorsuch explicitly declared that the 
derivative works analysis for originality is no different than a standard originality 
analysis.148 Accordingly, he listed cases involving both “copies of facts in the 
world” and “copies of prior works of art” as analogous to the case at hand.149 
Despite claiming to apply the ordinary Feist originality standard, the 
court inserted a heightened bar—usually only reserved for derivative 
works—by requiring that the author must not have intended to copy the 
referent accurately. The court created a two-part test for distinguishing a 
copy from an independent creation in the context of 3-D models: (1) the 
court must make an objective assessment of the particular models, and (2) 
the court must make an objective assessment of the parties’ purpose in 
creating the models.150 This test reveals the Frankenstein nature of merging 
a derivative-works and standard originality analysis. In analyzing the first 
prong, the court applied the standard means of assessing originality in 
photography, reciting almost wholesale the possible sources of originality 
in rendition.151 In analyzing the second prong, the court cited derivative 
works cases (including Bridgeman) that have considered a person’s intent 
regarding the accuracy or inaccuracy of her copying.152 Here, because the 
very nature of the technology was to reproduce its referent accurately,153 
the court held that the models were not independently created. In effect, 
 
146 Id. at 1261. 
147 Id. at 1264. 
148 Id. at n.7 (“[T]he originality analysis ought to be the same.”). But see Ets-Hokin v. Skyy 
Spirits, Inc., 225 F.3d 1068, 1073 (9th Cir. 2000) (suggesting that the derivative works standard for 
originality is different than the general originality standard for photography). 
149 Meshwerks, 528 F.3d at 1267. 
150 Id. at 1264. 
151 Id. at 1265 (noting that Meshwerks “did not make any decisions regarding lighting, shading, 
the background in front of which a vehicle would be posed, the angle at which to pose it, or the like” 
necessary to create a “new expression[] subject to copyright protection”). 
152 Id. at 1269 (“Other courts before us have examined and relied on a putative copyright holder’s 
intent in holding that the resultant work was not original and thus subject to copyright protection.”). 
153 The very nature of the technology may be enough evidence of an intent to reproduce 
the referent accurately. See, e.g., id. at 1269 (using the fact that “Meshwerks has consistently 
described digitization and modeling as an attempt accurately to depict real-world, three-dimensional 
objects as digital images viewable on a computer screen” to suggest an intent to copy rather than 
create original expression). 
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this test subjects all highly accurate mediums to the more rigorous standard 
of originality in derivative works.154 
How was the fundamental analytical distinction between copies of public 
domain reality and copies of externally created reality lost here? Meshwerks 
reaffirms the core culprit: the highly attractive, yet insidious, temptation on 
the part of judges to perceive all highly accurate, reality-reproducing 
technologies as analogous while utterly disregarding the particular nature of 
the referent. As long as the technology reproduces its referent with a high 
degree of accuracy, courts overlook the analytical significance of recognizing 
whether the referent is public domain reality, externally created reality, or 
new expression. In Meshwerks, for example, Judge Gorsuch relied heavily 
on the originality doctrine in photography in his analysis, reasoning that 
three-dimensional digital modeling and photography are alike in that they 
both seek to mimic reality:155 
But what can be said, at least based on received copyright doctrine, to 
distinguish an independent creation from a copy? And how might that 
doctrine apply in an age of virtual worlds and digital media that seek to mimic 
the “real” world, but often do so in ways that undoubtedly qualify as (highly) 
original? While there is little authority explaining how our received 
principles of copyright law apply to the relatively new digital medium before 
us, some lessons may be discerned from how the law coped in an earlier time 
with a previous revolution in technology: photography.156 
The conceptual metaphor of modeling-is-photography, in itself, is not 
unreasonable. The analytical move is as follows: the work before the court is 
a highly accurate representation of another work, which may be analogized to 
photographs because they are highly accurate representations of reality 
generally. However, the only thing the source domain and target domain have 
in common is their accuracy; they use completely different referents. And 
what our ontology of reality in copyright law has taught us so far is that the 
nature of the referent matters. 
Later courts, citing derivative works cases, have demanded that that 
representations of public domain reality are inaccurate because derivative 
works case law requires a “distinguishable variation” and an intent not to 
accurately reproduce the referent. While these requirements may make 
 
154 This standard for derivative works is more rigorous because of the need to protect an 
underlying copyrighted work. See, e.g., Entm’t Research Grp. v. Genesis Creative Grp., 122 F.3d 
1211, 1220 (9th Cir. 1997) (discussing the purpose behind requiring that derivative works have 
adequate originality). 
155 Indeed, Judge Gorsuch said that the 3-D models were merely “practically advantageous 
substitutes” for photographs. Id. at 1264. 
156 Id. at 1263. 
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sense in the context of a copy that reproduces externally created reality, 
they are illogical in the context of technologies that reproduce public 
domain reality157 because the very nature of these technologies is to 
accurately represent subject matter that, under the reality-is-commons 
conceptual metaphor, should be open to all for use as a referent.158 The 
problems of this approach have particularly appeared as later courts applied 
Meshwerks to non-derivative works. 
The rationale of Meshwerks, for example, has been applied in the context 
of two-dimensional scanning. The court in Home Legend, LLC v. Mannington 
Mills, Inc. faced the question: are two-dimensional scans159 of wood planks, 
where designers manipulated the planks to look more time-worn, sufficiently 
original?160 The Northern District of Georgia answered: no.161 The District 
Court reasoned that the scan was not sufficiently original because the plaintiff 
simply sought to recreate reality in another medium.162 The scans, the court 
 
157 The very nature of augmented reality is to combine created works with public domain. See, 
e.g. Take a Trip to the London of Yesteryear with New App, METRO, https://metro.co.uk/2014/02/26/
take-a-trip-to-the-london-of-yesteryear-with-new-app-4322243 [https://perma.cc/8HV9-GXGH] 
(describing an application that allows users to combine historical images of the London city streets 
with modern images at the same locations). While this Comment does not address this potential 
complexity, courts will likely have to tackle the issue of whether the regular originality analysis and 
derivative works analysis should interrelate. 
158 Highly accurate copies of public domain reality may still be unoriginal for other reasons; 
for example, they may not contain the minimal creativity required by Feist. However, these works 
should not fail the originality standard because they are not independently created—this would be 
an analytically unsound result, as this prong is concerned only with whether the work was copied 
from another work, i.e. a copyrightable referent. See Feist Publ’ns Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 
U.S. 340, 345 (1991) (“Original . . . means only that the work was independently created by the 
author (as opposed to copied from other works) . . . .” (emphasis added)); Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, 
Inc., 225 F.3d 1068, 1079 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he term ‘work’ or ‘works’ is used throughout the 
Copyright Act to refer to the ‘subject matter’ that the act is designed to protect: ‘original works of 
authorship.’”). Since public domain reality is not a copyrightable work, a copy of public domain 
reality usually should not fail because it is not an independent creation (excluding rare instances 
where, for example, there is not independent creation because there is no human author). 
159 Michael Weinberg correctly argues that analogizing to photography doesn’t provide any 
clear answers for scanning, but proposes a new intent-based test that fundamentally perpetuates the 
requirement from photography case law that subject matter must be manipulated “pre-shutter” 
(here, pre-scanning) in order to be original. See MICHAEL WEINBERGER, 3D SCANNING: A 
WORLD WITHOUT COPYRIGHT 7-8 (2016). 
160 32 F. Supp. 3d 1273 (N.D. Ga. 2014) rev’d 784 F.3d 1404 (11th Cir. 2015). 
161 Home Legend, 32 F. Supp. 3d at 1280. 
162 See id. at 1282 (reasoning that the scans were not original because the plaintiff merely sought 
to “copy the look of rusted wood . . . . simply attempt[ing] to recreate the look of natural, rustic 
wood in another medium—artwork”). 
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reasoned, were analogous to accurate molds of natural objects.163 And a design 
based in an intent to accurately copy natural elements is unoriginal.164 
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, using a wholesale 
analogy to photography to hold that the scans of wood planks were 
sufficiently original.165 The court found originality in the creation of subject 
matter, listing various “pre-scanning” activities that the designers engaged in 
to manipulate the planks: staining, painting, and using hand tools on the 
wood.166 The creative choices were the color of the wood and the location and 
character of the marks.167 If the designers had merely scanned raw wood 
planks without altering the color or texture the images would not have been 
protectable.168 Home Legend sharply reveals the analytical significance of 
identifying the correct nature of the referent: the District Court found there 
was no originality through characterizing the referent as public domain 
reality, while the Court of Appeals found originality by characterizing the 
referent as created or composed subject matter—new expression. 
Meshwerks also has, rather absurdly, been applied to traditional 
representations of reality such as wildlife illustrations. In Tomelleri v. 
Zazzle, for example, the District of Kansas painstakingly analyzed the ways 
in which an illustration of a fish varied from the public domain reality of 
the fish itself.169 The plaintiff was a highly skilled fish illustrator who 
worked from photographs and specimens of the fishes that he was 
illustrating.170 The illustrator had a “reputation for showing exactly what 
fish look like.”171 The defendant argued that the plaintiff ’s illustrations 
 
163 See id. (analogizing to Proline Concrete Tools, Inc. v. Gord Dennis, in which the District 
Court for the Northern District of California held that sculptures that were molds of existing 
stones or rocks were unoriginal). 
164 Id. at 1282 n.7. 
165 Home Legend, LLC v. Mannington Mills, Inc., 784 F.3d 1404, 1410 (11th Cir. 2015). 
Although applying the standard for originality in photography without much reasoning (besides 
citing to Meshwerks, which makes the same analytical move for 3-D models), the court admits that 
scanning is far more difficult to think of in terms of preshutter activities: 
And while photographs of natural objects may be original, it is difficult to imagine 
that the “selection of lighting, shading, timing, angle, and film” in a scan of raw wood 
plank—the goal being to duplicate as exactly as possible the appearance of that plank 
in a digital medium so that it could be faithfully reproduced on laminate flooring—
would be sufficiently original to support a copyright in such an individual image. 
Id. at 1410. 
166 Id. at 1410. 
167 Id. 
168 See id. (“Ideas alone are not protectible.”). 
169 No. 13-02576, 2015 WL 8375083 (D. Kan. Dec. 9, 2015). 
170 Id. at *1-2. 
171 Id. at *1. 
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were not original because they were accurate depictions of real animals.172 
Even in a traditional art form, in which the artist was working directly 
from public domain reality, the court applied Meshwerks and analyzed (1) 
whether there was a distinguishable variation between the illustration and 
the real-life specimen, and (2) the artist’s intent in creating the 
illustration.173 The court held that the illustration was original because 
there were distinguishable variations between the real fish and the drawing 
and because the artist’s intent was to be accurate, but not photorealistic.174 
That the court even engaged in this painstaking analysis to determine the 
originality of an illustration based on an animal specimen—not another 
work—is, frankly, absurd.175 The heart of the reality-is-commons 
conceptual metaphor is that individuals are free to “copy the original” 
where it is public domain reality.176 
These case studies highlight the analytical blurring that follows from 
jurists lacking a clear ontology of reality when tackling the protectability 
of highly accurate technologies. Fundamentally, courts neglect the 
analytical significance of reality as referent. Especially when courts engage 
in a wholesale analogy of new, highly accurate technologies to photography, 
they must be aware of the particular way in which photography case law 
navigates reality as a referent. Where public domain reality is the referent, 
the issue is not independent creation, but whether the resulting work meets 
the Feist requirement of minimal creativity (for example, through rendition 
or timing). Where externally created reality is the referent, a derivative 
works originality analysis may apply to ensure that giving copyright 
protection to the new work will not encroach on copyright protection for 
the preexisting work. And finally, where new expression is the referent, 
 
172 See id. at *9 (“Defendant argues that Plaintiff ’s illustrations are not entitled to copyright 
protection because they are accurate representations of real animals and therefore lack originality.”). 
173 Id. at *8. 
174 Id. at *9. 
175 For a more appropriate analysis of realistic animal representations, see Satava v. Lowry, 323 
F.3d 805 (9th Cir. 2003). In Satava, the plaintiff glass artist created realistic sculptures of jelly fish 
encased in glass. Id. at 807. The court held that such sculptures obtain very thin copyright in the 
elements of artistic expression that were not scenes a faire, or in other words, were not essential to 
the depicting the animal itself: 
Nature gives us ideas of animals in their natural surroundings: an eagle with talons 
extended to snatch a mouse; a grizzly bear clutching a salmon between its teeth; a 
butterfly emerging from its cocoon; a wolf howling at the full moon; a jellyfish 
swimming through tropical waters. These ideas, first expressed by nature, are the 
common heritage of humankind, and no artist may use copyright law to prevent others 
from depicting them. 
Id. at 813. The court focused here on not “cheat[ing] the public domain” by protecting bare reality. 
Id. at 813. 
176 Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 249 (1903). 
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photography case law tells us that copyright protection extends to the 
subject matter itself. Thus, to tackle new reality technologies, it is 
analytically essential that courts understand whether reality-as-referent 
was created, and if so, by whom. 
B. Reality-is-Facts; Facts-are-Discoveries 
Scholars and jurists often use the language of facts177 to understand 
the concept of reality.178 In many cases, for example, courts employ the 
fact–expression dichotomy179 to deal with highly accurate representations 
of reality, such as maps.180 Indeed, in Meshwerks v. Toyota Motor Sales, 
Inc., Judge Gorsuch repeatedly used the phrase “facts in the world” to refer 
to the category of things that were excluded by the fact-expression 
dichotomy in the context of highly accurate 3-D models.181 The “fact in 
 
177 See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 105, at 93 (titling her article criticizing Feist’s doctrine 
regarding facts as “Reality as Artifact”); Justin Hughes, Created Facts and the Flawed Ontology 
of Copyright Law, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 43, 60 (describing facts as pieces of reality without 
analyzing whether this equation is valid); cf. Hughes, supra note 106, at 342 (equating facts 
with subject matter, noting that “the problem of copyright protection for photographs is really 
the same problem as copyright protection for compilations of fact because photographs are, 
from one perspective, databases”). 
178 There has been extensive scholarly attention given to the judicial treatment of facts 
in copyright law, particularly in the context of created facts and purported facts. See infra 
text accompanying note 186; see also Alan L. Durham, Speaking of the World: Fact, Opinion, and 
the Originality Standard of Copyright, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 791, 838 (2001) (distinguishing between 
hard facts and soft facts, then arguing that the distinction is flawed); Gordon, supra note 105, 
at 101 (arguing that Feist was analytically flawed because it failed to take into account created 
facts); Hughes, Created Facts, supra note 177, at 57-59 (differentiating between facts that are 
intrinsic to nature, human facts, and created facts); Michelle R. Silverstein, The 
Copyrightability of Factual Compilations: An Interpretation of Feist Through Cases of Maps and 
Numbers, 1996 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 147, 151 (1996) (proposing a definition of “fact:” “a fact is 
discovered rather than created, a fact is an important building block of knowledge, and a fact 
is presented to its audience as factual and true”). This Comment will not repeat the scholarly 
literature about the proper treatment of facts, as it is a complex and often convoluted issue. 
Since our mission here is archeological, this Comment will not debate whether Feist was 
correctly decided or not. Rather, this Comment evaluates Feist’s conceptual metaphors of 
reality to flesh out the conceptual model of reality. 
179 The fact–expression dichotomy asserts that facts themselves are not protectable, while 
expressions of fact may be protectable if they are sufficiently original. See, e.g., Feist Publ’ns Inc. v. 
Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 350 (1991) (“Facts, whether alone or as part of a compilation, are 
not original and therefore may not be copyrighted. A factual compilation is eligible for copyright if 
it features an original selection or arrangement of facts . . . .”). 
180 See, e.g., Mason v. Montgomery Data, Inc., 967 F.2d 135 (5th Cir. 1992); supra subsection 
II.A.3 (discussing the reality-as-subject-matter metaphor). 
181 528 F.3d 1258, 1264 (10th Cir. 2008) (emphasis added). The author can find no reference to 
this phrase—“facts in the world”—before Meshwerks, and Judge Gorsuch does not cite a source for 
the phrase. It appears, however, in a few scholarly articles. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 105, at 94. 
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the world” at issue there, however, was the existence of a Toyota car—a 
created object that is part of externally created reality.182 
It is black letter law that facts are excluded from copyright protection 
because they fail the originality standard.183 This is because facts, according 
to the Supreme Court, are discovered rather than created: 
No one may claim originality as to facts. This is because facts do not owe their 
origin to an act of authorship. The distinction is one between creation and discovery: 
The first person to find and report a particular fact has not created the fact; 
he or she has merely discovered its existence. To borrow from Burrow-Giles, 
one who discovers a fact is not its maker or originator. The discoverer merely 
finds and records . . . . [Facts] may not be copyrighted and are part of the 
public domain available to every person.184 
Thus, reality enters the § 102(b)185 realm of unprotectable things 
through its ultimate characterization as a discovery. If reality-is-facts and 
facts-are-discoveries, through the transitive property, reality-is-discoveries. 
Figure 4 shows §102(b) as a radial category incorporating discoveries and 
reality. 
 
Figure 4: 17 U.S.C. §102(b) As a Radial Category Incorporating the Reality-is-
Facts and Facts-are-Discoveries Conceptual Metaphors 
182 Meshwerks, 528 F.3d at 1264. 
183 See Feist, 499 U.S. at 344 (“That there can be no valid copyright in facts is universally 
understood.”). 
184 Id. at 347-48 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
185 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012) (“In no case does copyright protection for an original work of 
authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, 
or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in 
such work.” (emphasis added)). 
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Many scholars have argued that the Supreme Court was plainly wrong in 
Feist because of its apparent failure to take “created facts” into account.186 
Indeed, on its face Feist doesn’t account for the many cases giving protection 
to “created facts” such as predictions and projections, and denying protection 
to merely purported facts.187 In order to flesh out our conceptual model, 
accepting Feist, we must evaluate the nature of facts as it relates to the reality-
is-facts metaphor. We will focus here on the more nuanced conceptual 
metaphor of Meshwerks: reality-is-facts-in-the-world. 
For most, the reality-is-facts-in-the-world metaphor seems intuitive: 
reality is factual because we tend to think of it as actually occurring, and is 
“in the world” because we think that it has an objective existence outside of 
the human mind.188 In addition, because it is black letter law that facts are 
not protected under copyright law, the reality-is-facts-in-the-world 
metaphor is a useful tool for courts to use in excluding highly accurate 
representations of reality from protection.189 
It is necessary to pause here to note the distinction between a fact and a 
representation of a fact because courts often subconsciously conflate the two. 
A fact is “out there in the world,” while a representation of a fact is a “human 
 
186 See, e.g., Durham, supra note 178, at 795 (“[S]o few facts are entirely free of subjectivity 
and opinion, one questions the continuing vitality of Feist’s prohibition against copyrighting 
facts.”); Gordon, supra note 105, at 106 (“The Court in Feist therefore made a significant 
epistemological and doctrinal error when it insisted that facts were incapable of being 
created”); Silverstein, supra note 178, at 162 (“[T]he court in Feist failed to explain clearly what 
qualifies as an unprotectable fact.”). 
187 See, e.g., CDN, Inc. v. Kapes, 197 F.3d 1256, 1261 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that numerical 
price estimates were original because they were the product of “judgment [used] to distill and 
extrapolate from factual data”); CCC Info. Servs., Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Mkt. Reports, 44 
F.3d 61, 67 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that Red Book valuations were original because they were 
not pre-existing facts that were merely discovered, but rather the product of Red Book editors’ 
“professional judgment and expertise”); Arica Inst., Inc. v. Palmer, 970 F.2d 1067, 1075 (2d Cir. 
1992) (using estoppel theory to bar an author from arguing that his work was expressive when 
he had represented it as “scientifically verifiable ‘facts’ of human nature”); Nash v. CBS, Inc., 
899 F.2d 1537, 1541 (7th Cir. 1990) (denying protection to a historical interpretation using the 
fact–expression dichotomy and reasoning that it makes “all the difference” that the author of a 
historical interpretation portrayed his work as fact, not fiction). 
188 See, e.g., BRAINARD, supra note 7, at 203 n.1 (“‘[R]eal’ historically refers to what exists 
independently of our minds.”). 
189 By characterizing the referent as factual, courts can use the fact–expression dichotomy to 
deny copyright protection. See generally supra subsection II.A.3 (discussing the prototype effect in 
the originality doctrine, where courts have a preference for inaccurate representations of reality). 
This use of the fact–expression dichotomy to deny protection in visual works has been especially 
pronounced in maps. See, e.g., Mason v. Montgomery Data, Inc., 967 F.2d 135, 142 (5th Cir. 1992) 
(“Historically, most courts have treated maps solely as compilations of facts.”); David B. Wolf, Is 
There Any Copyright Protection for Maps After Feist?, 39 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 224, 239-40 
(1992) (arguing that a map should not be treated as solely a compilation of facts because “[a] map 
does not present objective reality; just as a photograph’s pictorial form is central to its nature, so a 
map transforms reality into a unique pictorial form central to its nature”). 
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[attempt] to depict” that fact.190 In his thoughtful study of the history of facts 
in copyright law, Justin Hughes notes that “when a distinguished judge or 
scholar just says facts are not protected by copyright law, he or she is engaged 
in a form of shorthand that is more than just imprecision. It is a subconscious 
application of copyright’s merger doctrine.”191 
The merger doctrine holds that “[w]hen the ‘idea’192 and its ‘expression’ 
are . . . inseparable, copying the ‘expression’ will not be barred.”193 Similarly, 
where there are no more than a few ways of expressing a fact, providing 
copyright protection over the expression would be the practical equivalent of 
giving protection over the fact itself.194 Thus, in these cases, courts find that 
fact and expression have “merged” and deny protection. Such a merger 
between fact and expression is highly likely because, by their nature, facts can 
only be represented in only one or a few correct ways.195 The problem is thus: 
“the canonical way to specify the fact is the same as the way to specify the 
expression of the fact, i.e., by expressing it.”196 A more accurate depiction of the 
metaphors here is: reality-is-facts-in-the-world and representation-of-reality-is-
representation-of-facts-in-the-world. A mouthful, but more accurate. 
The Meshwerks description of facts as in the world is typical of the realism 
of the U.S. legal system.197 The concept of facts as coming “from a distance” 
and from beyond one’s own “self-contained community” gives them 
 
190 Gordon, supra note 105, at 94 (“The [Feist] opinion reads as if the Supreme Court 
distinguished two sorts of facts—Facts1, that are ‘out there in the world’ and Facts2 that are human 
attempts to depict Facts1—and denied copyright in lists of Facts2 on the ground that Facts1 and Facts2 
were the same.”). The terminology used by the Court in Feist to refer to the facts at issue—telephone 
numbers, towns, and names—supports the line drawn between facts and representations of facts. The 
Court’s use of modifiers such as “raw,” “bare,” “underlying,” and “pre-existing” suggests that the Court 
is referring to facts themselves rather than representations of the facts. Feist Publ’ns Inc. v. Rural Tel. 
Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 348, 350, 361 (1991). 
191 Hughes, Created Facts, supra note 177, at 56. 
192 The merger doctrine applies equally to the fact–expression dichotomy. See, e.g., Robert C. 
Denicola, Copyright in Collections of Facts: A Theory for the Protection of Nonfiction Literary Works, 81 
COLUM. L. REV. 516, 526 n.52 (1981) (“For the purposes of copyright infringement, data and ideas 
are treated as equivalents.”). 
193 Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir. 1971). 
194 See, e.g., Feist, 499 U.S. at 350 (“This Court has long recognized that the fact–expression 
dichotomy limits severely the scope of protection in fact-based works.”). 
195 Hughes, Created Facts supra note 177, at 56. 
196 Id. at 57. Some argue that there is no independent existence of the fact apart from its 
expression. See Litman, supra note 76, at 996-97 (arguing that facts “do not exist independently of 
the lenses through which they are viewed”); cf. Durham, supra note 178, at 839 (“That is not to say 
that there is no world ‘out there,’ rather that the world does not ‘split itself up, on its own initiative, 
into sentence-shaped chunks called ‘facts.’” (internal citations omitted)). 
197 See Hughes, Created Facts, supra note 177, at 49 (“This observable fact that is ‘out there’ 
became foundational for empiricism, for the kind of public policy debates that took hold in the West 
in the eighteenth century, and, arguably, for democratic self-governance itself.”). 
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legitimacy as tools of debate and discovery.198 In addition, the view of facts as 
“things people can see and of which they can form clear, mental pictures” is 
at the root of logical positivism and scientific realism.199 Thus, through using 
the reality-is-facts-in-the-world metaphor, courts are implicitly taking what 
has been termed the third-person account of reality,200 one “anchored in what 
remains the same for everyone irrespective of first-person experience.”201 
Recall, for example, the description in Kelly v. Morris of reality as 
“common objects of information”202 and in Blunt v. Patten of reality as “open 
to the examination of all.”203 These descriptions support a third-person 
understanding of reality as consisting of things that remain the same for 
everyone—it is a collective, rather than an individual experience. We 
identified this earlier through the reality-is-commons metaphor. Also recall 
Holmes’s description in Bleistein of reality as “actual” and consisting of 
“visible things.”204 These descriptors are clear indicators of a third-person 
view of reality—one that sees reality as “mind-independent” and objective.205 
And that courts understand reality from a third-person perspective is entirely 
unsurprising, as historically the third-person account is what most people 
intuitively think of as reality.206 Thus, the reality-is-facts-in-the-world 
metaphor points us towards a definition of facts as existing “out there” in the 
world, just like reality exists “out there” in the world.207 
While it is clear that the reality-is-facts-in-the-world metaphor 
accommodates our intuitive understanding of reality as objective and 
actual, does it also accommodate our common understanding of reality 
 
198 Id. at 50-51. 
199 Id. at 51. 
200 Id. at 55 (“It seems pretty clear that the legal system adheres to the correspondence theory: 
the facts are out there, quite separate from subjective viewpoints.”). 
201 BRAINARD, supra note 7, at 22; see also Jan Westerhoff, What is Reality?, NEW 
SCIENTIST (Sept. 29, 2012), http://landing.newscientist.com/department-for-education-
feature-2 [https://perma.cc/T8WP-5W7B] (proposing that we equate reality “with a world 
without us, a world untouched by human desires and intentions”). 
202 Kelly v. Morris (1866) 1 LR Eq. 696 at 701 (Eng.). 
203 Blunt v. Patten, 3 F. Cas. 763, 764-65 (S.D.N.Y. 1828) (No. 1580). 
204 Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 249 (1903). 
205 BRAINARD, supra note 7, at 18. 
206 Supra note 188 and accompanying text. 
207 There is however an alternative understanding of the nature of facts as human constructions 
that are formed by our subjective perceptions and societal conditions. Hughes, Created Facts, supra 
note 177, at 52-53. This view of facts corresponds with the first-person account of reality. Most 
powerfully articulated by French philosopher René Descartes, this theory argues that reality can 
only be understood from the subjective viewpoint of the individual: “[T]he first-person view gives 
an object as it is for you or me personally, as we ourselves experience it or think of it.” BRAINARD, 
supra note 7, at 15. It consists of our “personal perceptions, feelings, values, consciousness, will, sense 
of self, and the like.” Id. at 17. 
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as including created things?208 In Meshwerks, Judge Gorsuch understood 
a created thing—a Toyota car—to be out there “in the world” as part of 
his reality.209 In addition, in photography cases, the “reality of [the] 
subject matter”210 encompassed everything that the author herself did 
not create: things with no human author (public domain reality) and 
things with a different human author (externally created reality).211 
Finally, an understanding of reality-as-commons—that is, reality as 
“common objects of information”212 and “open to the examination of 
all”213—is broad enough to encompass created things.214 The view of 
reality as both noncreated and created is perfectly consistent with the 
third-person view of reality as existing irrespective of first-person 
experience. Reality would exclude entirely subjective experiences such 
as delusions, but include things that are created and common to all (such 
as a Toyota car or the Mona Lisa).215 
Feist, however, held that discoveries (and by extension, facts and reality) 
are not created.216 This Comment argues that the description of facts in Feist 
as discovered rather than created can be reconciled with the reality-is-facts-
in-the-world metaphor—with reality defined as including both created and 
noncreated things that are common to all—as long as we are conscious about 
the role of authorship and perspective in defining a “discovery.” Robert C. 
 
208 Indeed, Wendy Gordon notes that “[w]hen an artist sends an artifact into the world, it 
affects other people and becomes part of their reality.” Gordon, supra note 105, at 99. 
209 Meshwerks, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., 528 F.3d 1258, 1264 (10th Cir. 2008). 
210 Franklin Mint Corp. v. Nat’l Wildlife Art Exch., 575 F.2d 62, 65 (3d Cir. 1978). 
211 The use of other authors’ works as subject matter is particularly pronounced in so-called 
“appropriation art,” described as “the more or less direct taking over into a work of art a real object 
or even an existing work of art.” Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 699 (2d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). In Cariou, the court evaluated whether using another author’s photographs “in 
whole or substantial part” in a series of paintings and collages was fair use. Id. at 710. For other 
examples of cases addressing appropriation art see, Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2006), 
which addressed whether using photographs from fashion magazines and advertisements to create a 
collage was fair use, and Graham v. Prince, 265 F. Supp. 3d 366 (S.D.N.Y. 2017), in which the court 
evaluated whether merely framing another author’s photograph as an Instagram post was sufficiently 
transformative to be fair use. 
212 Kelly v. Morris (1866) 1 LR Eq. 696 at 701 (Eng.). 
213 Blunt v. Patten, 3 F. Cas. 763, 764-65 (S.D.N.Y. 1828) (No. 1580). 
214 For example, the Mona Lisa is created but it seems to exist for everyone irrespective of 
their own first-person experience. 
215 Interestingly, Michelle Silverstein defines reality as “anything that exists or has existed in 
a state of nature or anything for which there is or has been one objective answer or truth.” Silverstein, 
supra note 178, at 176. Silverstein defined reality for the purposes of analyzing facts, and thus her 
definition is suited for that particular purpose. Id. at 176-77. However, we have established that the 
first part of her definition is too limited because reality includes things that are not in a state of 
nature. And the second part of her definition engages metaphysical issues that we have decided are 
beyond the scope of this Comment. 
216 Feist Publ’ns Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 347-48 (1991). 
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Denicola, in his article quoted by the Supreme Court in Feist for the 
proposition that facts are discovered, notes that the view of facts as 
discoveries “does not depend upon adherence to an objective view of reality. 
We are equally unaccustomed to speaking of people as the ‘authors’ of their individual 
perceptions.”217 A person, quite simply, is not the author of the reality she 
perceives, or in other words, the reality she discovers but does not create. 
Under this view, discoveries may be defined subjectively as consisting of 
everything that is not authored by the particular creator at hand; labeling 
something as a discovery simply means that “the existence of the information 
is not dependent on the efforts of its discoverer.”218 
Thus, the reality-is-facts-in-the-world metaphor holds true if we 
understand “discovery” from the subjective perspective of the next creator. 
And it makes good sense to do so, considering the central purpose of the 
fact/expression dichotomy: the need to balance protection with progress. 
Indeed, it is a principle internal to the structure of copyright law that the 
level of copyright protection must not hamper progress (a principle that this 
Comment will discuss further in Part IV). In order to achieve this balance, 
the perspective of the next creator is the only perspective we care about—it 
is the next creator who must draw on a reservoir of past creativity in order to 
generate future creative works. For the next creator, all of public domain 
reality and externally created reality are discoveries because their existence 
does not depend on her own efforts. 
Feist itself supports this broader notion of a discovery. Although Feist 
at times seems to suggest that a discovery must be entirely novel,219 in 
application, it utilizes the broader understanding of a discovery as 
something that merely does not owe its origin to the relevant creator.220 
Surely, the names, towns, and telephone numbers at issue in Feist were 
known by someone before Rural’s efforts to memorialize them in a 
directory. This information, however, was new to and not authored by the 
 
217 Robert C. Denicola, Copyright in Collections of Facts: A Theory for the Protection of Nonfiction 
Literary Works, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 516, 525 n.49 (1981) (emphasis added). 
218 Id. at 525 (emphasis added); see also Feist, 499 U.S. at 346 (defining author as “he to whom 
anything owes its origin; originator; maker” (quoting Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 
U.S. 53, 58 (1884))). 
219 In its initial analysis of the concept of discovery, the Court suggests that novelty may be 
relevant: “The first person to find and report a particular fact has not created the fact; he or she has 
merely discovered its existence.” Feist, 499 U.S. at 347. 
220 The Court later seems to concede that novelty is irrelevant to determining whether 
something is a discovery for purposes of copyright law. Instead, the Court asks simply whether the 
information owed its origin to the author at issue. See id. at 361 (“Rural may have been the first to 
discover and report the names, towns, and telephone numbers of its subscribers, but this data does 
not ‘ow[e] its origin’ to Rural . . . ; [the facts] existed before Rural reported them and would have 
continued to exist if Rural had never published a telephone directory.”). 
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relevant creator—Rural. Thus, according to the Supreme Court, the 
information was discovered by Rural. It simply does not follow from Feist’s 
analysis that discoveries must be entirely novel or not created by any 
human author.221 In order to qualify as a discovery, something merely must 
be novel to and not created by the next creator. Indeed, if the definition of 
discoveries was limited to entirely novel finds—things that had never been 
encountered by another human being—the scope of the fact–expression 
dichotomy post-Feist would be absurdly narrow.222 
Thus, an appreciation for authorship and perspective is critical in 
defining a discovery, and by extension, reality. Working through some 
illustrative examples may help us understand how the perspective of the next 
creator is operationalized in our ontology of reality. For example, Albert 
Einstein created the factual expression E = mc2 to describe a fact of public 
domain reality (relativity). The expression E = mc2 was not a part of 
Einstein’s reality when he created it; rather, it was new expression. However, 
his expression of the fact would likely be considered to merge with the fact 
itself such that copyright law would deny protection. On the other hand, the 
expression E = mc2 is part of the bundle of things that compose the next 
creator’s reality—its existence does not depend on her efforts, and thus it is 
a discovery. The next creator could not obtain copyright protection over the 
expression E = mc2 because it is a part of her externally created reality. 
Consider a more artistic example: Jeff Koons’s Balloon Dog.223 To the next 
creator, this work is a discovery. She did not create it, and the work exists 
 
221 Indeed, Feist even seems to suggest that facts do not need to be objectively true or verifiable. 
The Court in Feist did not hesitate in including four fictitious listings—“copyright traps” hidden in 
the defendant’s directory—to be in the realm of unprotectable “facts.” Id. at 344; see also supra note 
187 and accompanying text (noting how courts have used an estoppel rationale to prevent individuals 
representing information as factual from later claiming it is fictional and thus expressive). 
222 Cf. Durham, supra note 178, at 838 (“Indeed, one wonders whether there are enough hard 
facts to preserve the principle of Feist that facts in general are uncopyrightable . . . .”). 
223 This work was installed (and then vandalized) in augmented reality. Andrew R. Chow, 
Snapchat and Jeff Koons Collaborate on Augmented Reality Art Project, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/03/arts/design/snapchat-and-jeff-koons-collaborate-on-augmented-
reality-art-project.html; Anna Codrea-Rado, Virtual Vandalism: Jeff Koons’s ‘Balloon Dog’ is Graffiti-Bombed, 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/10/arts/design/augmented-reality-jeff-
koons.html. The artist who graffitied the work, Sebastian Errazuriz, did so “as part of a ‘stance against 
an imminent AR corporate invasion.’” Jason Sayer, Who’s in Charge of the Augmented City?, CITY LAB, 
(March 12, 2018), https://www.citylab.com/design/2018/03/whos-in-charge-of-the-augmented-city/
554324 [https://perma.cc/SU7Y-FSMF]. Indeed, augmented reality is a blossoming medium for 
appropriation art. See, e.g., Mack DeGeurin, Internet Artists Invaded the MoMA With a Guerrilla 
Augmented Reality Exhibit, MOTHERBOARD (March 5, 2018), https://motherboard.vice.com/
en_us/article/8xd3mg/moma-augmented-reality-exhibit-jackson-pollock-were-from-the-internet 
[https://perma.cc/Y7JC-6PBP] (describing how a collective of eight internet artists transformed the 
Jackson Pollock room in the MoMA through overlaying their own works on top of the Jackson 
Pollock paintings with augmented reality technology). 
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independent of her own efforts. Thus, the work becomes a part of the next 
creator’s externally created reality. Note that considering Balloon Dog to be a 
fact of the next creator’s reality does not diminish copyright protection for 
Koons under this ontology of reality—when he created Balloon Dog, it was 
not a fact of his world. Rather, it was new expression and thus qualified for 
copyright protection.224 Importantly, the fact/expression dichotomy only 
excludes copyright protection for things that were facts from the perspective of 
the creator seeking protection (here, the next creator). 
Thus, the reality-is-facts-in-the-world and facts-are-discoveries 
conceptual metaphors reveal that reality itself is not authored, and thus not 
original, because it does not owe its origin to the next creator. Instead, reality 
functions as a factual referent for the next creator’s new expression. Reality 
consists of everything that is common to all—public domain reality and 
externally created reality—but excludes those things that the next creator 
created but did not discover (new expression). 
III. THE CONCEPTUAL MODEL 
This Section summarizes and illustrates the ontology we have constructed 
through the intertwining metaphors of reality, with Figure 5 showing a visual 
representation of the conceptual model. Critically, the reality metaphors 
reveal that the ontology of reality in copyright law hinges on the perspective 
of the next creator. Thus, our ontology of reality is constructed from the 
perspective of the next creator. 
 
 
224 See infra Part IV (noting that a merger analysis where a formerly protected expression could 
lose protection by subsequent creators seeing it as a fact is conspicuously absent from the current 
ontology of reality); see also Gordon, supra note 105, at 97 (arguing that created works should lose 
protection as soon as they are referenced as facts of other creators’ realities). 
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Figure 5: Conceptual Model of Reality from the Perspective of  
the Next Creator 
The first branch of our model separates reality from the new expression 
of the next creator. The reality-is-original, reality-is-subject-matter, and 
representation-is-copy conceptual metaphors reveal that the distinction 
between the referent and the author’s own work is a basic, yet critical, line to 
draw. The core function of reality in copyright law is as a referent, and thus it 
must be distinguished from the next creator’s new expression that uses reality 
as a referent. Critically, the next creator’s new expression is not a component 
of reality for purposes of copyright law because it is authored and not 
discovered by the next creator. Further, the originality-is-variation metaphor 
teaches that this new expression should vary from its referent in some way in 
order to be deemed original, at least in the case when externally created 
reality is the referent. 
The reality-is-facts and facts-are-discoveries conceptual metaphors 
teach that reality, as a referent for the next creator, must consist solely of 
“independent reality”—those things that the next creator did not herself 
create. The reality-is-commons metaphor reveals that public domain 
reality—that part of reality with no human author—is an essential 
component of independent reality and unique in that it may be freely copied 
by future creators. The reality-is-subject-matter conceptual metaphor tells 
us that independent reality also includes things that have a human author 
other than the next creator: externally created reality. Importantly, 
externally created reality consists of copies—works that may be protected 
by copyright law. Thus, an author must be cautious of the potential for 
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infringement and lack of independent creation when she uses externally 
created reality as a referent. 
This Section illustrates our conceptual model using three hyper-simplified 
hypothetical illustrations. Imagine a world with only three people: Creator1, 
Creator2, and Creator3. Because the application of our conceptual model 
depends heavily on the nature of the creator’s referent—i.e. whether it 
primarily consists of public domain reality or externally created reality—we 
will examine how the conceptual model operates for creators living in three 
differently composed realities: an independent reality consisting entirely of 
public domain reality (subsection A); an independent reality consisting 
partially of public domain reality and partially of externally created reality 
(subsection B); and finally, an independent reality consisting entirely of 
externally created reality (subsection C).225 These illustrations allow us to 
glimpse the potential implications of the current ontology of reality for new 
reality technologies. 
A. A State of Nature 
Our first creator lives in a state of nature. There have been no other 
creators, and thus Creator1’s reality consists only of public domain reality. 
Creator1 may copy the public domain reality with no fear of infringement 
because it has no human author. Thus, she has a great deal of freedom to use 
reality as a referent for her creative works. And her works—whether in the 
first, second, or third order of simulation—will likely be considered original 
if there is a minimal spark of creativity. Thus, as long as she is the author and 
her works are memorialized in a tangible medium, her work will be 
protectable under copyright law.226 
B. The Modern World 
Next, imagine a world with a mix of public domain reality and externally 
created reality.227 It turns out that Creator1 had a prolific career designing 
urban landscapes, and now about fifty percent of Creator2’s reality consists of 
copyrighted works authored by Creator1. Later in life, Creator1’s particular 
specialty was designing billboards for advertisers. 
 
225 These three realities track Baudrillard’s three orders of simulation. See supra subsection II.A.2. 
226 If her works are highly accurate copies of independent reality, this protection will be “thin,” 
however. See supra note 130 (introducing the concept of “thin” or “porous” protection where the 
subject matter is independent reality). 
227 See Gordon, supra note 105, at 101 (“In a civilized nation, much of reality is artifact. Too 
broad a set of intellectual property rights can give one set of persons control over how that reality 
is viewed, perceived, interpreted—control over what the world means.”). 
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Creator2 also has a creative spark, however, and seeks to diversify the art 
scene. As she sets out to create, Creator2 may still freely use the fifty percent 
of public domain reality that remains as a referent for her work—far less 
material to reference than was available to Creator1. In addition, fifty percent 
of Creator2’s reality is composed of Creator1’s works. Having grown up in a 
city full of Creator1’s splashy billboards, Creator2 would like to use elements 
of Creator1’s designs in her own work in order to comment on Creator1 
“selling out” to advertisers.228 She is worried, however, about the possibility 
of infringing Creator1’s copyright rights in the billboards. So, she sticks to the 
ever-dwindling source material of public domain reality to use as a referent 
for her creativity. Creator2 will likely be able to obtain copyright protection 
over her works, but her creativity is limited due to fifty percent of her reality 
being an unavailable referent.229 
Change the scenario slightly. Creator2’s reality now includes fifty percent 
public domain reality and fifty percent externally created reality because 
Creator2 is wearing augmented reality contact lenses. Her vision is thus filled 
with virtual objects designed by Creator1. In the nature of a second order of 
simulation, the simulated objects in Creator2’s vision are so realistic that she has 
a hard time distinguishing between the two types of reality. Seeing a flower 
bloom in her garden one day, she sets out to make an accurate sculpture of the 
flower. It turns out that the flower was the copyrighted design of Creator1 and 
that she may be infringing her copyright rights. Because the consequences of 
copying public domain reality and externally created reality are drastically 
different, and Creator2 has no good way of distinguishing between noncreated 
and created objects, she may be discouraged from creating works based on 
reality as a referent in general. Importantly, this illustration reveals that where 
externally created reality consists of second order simulations, a creator may not 
only be deterred from using externally created reality as a referent, but may also 
be deterred from using public domain reality as a referent due to her inability 
to distinguish between the two. 
 
228 See supra note 211 (discussing appropriation art). 
229 A defense of fair use is always available to creators who seek to comment on other authors’ 
works. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (holding that parody, like 
other forms of social commentary and criticism, may be fair use). However, the threat of potential 
litigation may deter many creators with a valid fair use defense. Indeed, exactly what will be 
considered sufficiently “transformative” for fair use is extremely difficult to predict ex ante. See Brian 
Sites, Fair Use and the New Transformative, 39 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 513, 515 (2016) (noting that the 
unpredictability of fair use has deterred creativity: “[U]ncertainty has a price. A 2014 report by the 
College Art Association found that a significant portion of the art community, broadly defined, has 
avoided or abandoned works because of copyright concerns . . .”). Here, we assume that Creator2 
will be sufficiently deterred by the potential threat of litigation from Creator1. 
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C. Hyperreality 
Despite fears of infringement, Creator2 has been very busy. Feeling that 
a more ecofriendly way to create was through virtual mediums, she entirely 
recreated the fifty percent of public domain reality remaining in the modern 
world in virtual reality. Her world is purely virtual; none of public domain 
reality remains visible through her virtual reality contact lenses. 
Due to her beautiful graphic design and the exciting possibilities offered 
by a virtual life, many people have chosen to live their lives in Creator2’s 
virtual world through wearing virtual reality contact lenses. Creator3 is one 
of those individuals, and is inspired to comment on and add to Creator2’s 
virtual environment. However, all of the reality that is available for Creator3 
to use as a referent was authored by Creator2. How can Creator3 comment on 
her own reality without infringing Creator2’s copyright rights? 
Sure, Creator3 could attempt to make her work “transformative,” thus hoping 
that she would have a defense of fair use if sued by Creator2 for infringement.230 
She could try to build something entirely from her own imagination, but very 
little creativity can exist without building somehow on prior creativity, and 
Creator3 feels that an accurate depiction of her virtual environment is necessary 
to give her work meaning.231 Creator3 will either be barred from accurately 
depicting her reality-as-referent, or risk facing a lawsuit. 
Here, Creator3 is embroiled in a problem of the anticommons.232 In 
hyperreality, too many monopoly rights exist; as a result, earlier rights holders 
may prevent new creators from making productive uses of creative resources. 
This Comment has thus far highlighted the central role of reality-as-referent, 
i.e., reality as a creative resource for use by the next creator. These 
illustrations reveal that hyperreality in particular threatens to destabilize this 
central role of reality-as-referent. 
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR NEW REALITY TECHNOLOGIES 
What is missing in this ontology of reality that could allow courts to 
effectively cope with new reality technologies? First, there is absent a robust 
merger doctrine in which created parts of our reality, which may start out as 
protectable under copyright law, lose their protection as they become large 
 
230 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (“Although . . . transformative use is not absolutely necessary for 
a finding of fair use, the goal of copyright . . . is generally furthered by the creation of transformative 
works.” (internal citations omitted)). 
231 See infra Part IV (discussing the derivative nature of creativity). 
232 See Heller, supra note 75, at 624 (“In an anticommons . . . multiple owners are each endowed 
with the right to exclude others from a scarce resource, and no one has an effective privilege of use. 
When there are too many owners holding rights of exclusion, the resource is prone to underuse—a 
tragedy of the anticommons.” (emphasis added)). 
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parts of our reality. A more robust merger doctrine may allow courts to 
maintain the core function of reality-as-referent.233 
In addition, the metaphor of reality-is-commons is lurking in the 
background of our ontology of reality, but it does not play any dominant or 
active role in the conceptual model. We discussed it primarily alongside the 
reality-is-original metaphor and the proposition that public domain reality is 
a freely accessible referent for copying. However, amongst all the features of 
the currently existing ontology of reality, the reality-is-commons metaphor 
may become the most important in the context of new reality technologies. 
To understand the power of the reality-is-commons metaphor, we must 
explore further the place of the public domain in copyright law. 
The existence of a public domain is a bedrock principle in copyright law. 
Where there is a public domain, there is a collection of works that are given 
no protection and thus may be copied or appropriated without legal remedy. 
The principle that some works must remain unprotected is essential to fulfill 
the constitutional mandate that copyright law must “promote the Progress of 
Science and the useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and 
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”234 
In copyright law, the existence of a public domain has at least three 
constitutional hooks. First, the provision that protection must be for “limited 
times” commands that an author may not obtain a perpetual monopoly in her 
work. Some works, then, will fall into the public domain simply because the 
term of protection has expired. Second, the constitutional terms “authors” 
and “writings” have been interpreted to require a human author, a minimal 
amount of creativity, and fixation in a tangible medium of expression as 
prerequisites for obtaining copyright protection.235 These two constitutional 
hooks invite a negative definition of the public domain as everything not 
protected by copyright, either because the term of the legal protection has 
expired or copyright law could never extend protection to the work because 
 
233 See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 105, at 97 (arguing that created facts should lose protection 
when they become part of our reality); supra note 23 (noting that Feist may suggest that once-original 
works may lose their protection over time by becoming “age-old,” traditional, or commonplace). 
Such a doctrine may not be judicially administrable, however. How would courts decide which parts 
of our externally created reality are sufficiently commonplace to lose protection? 
234 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
235 This constitutional language is the source of the originality standard, the fixation requirement, 
and the fact-expression dichotomy. See, e.g., Feist Publ’ns Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 
346-47 (1991) (discussing the constitutional roots of the originality standard and fact-expression 
dichotomy); Kelley v. Chicago Park Dist., 635 F.3d 290, 303 (7th Cir. 2011) (noting that the word 
“writings” is the constitutional hook for the fixation requirement). 
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it does not satisfy a requirement of protectability. Because of its simplicity, 
the predominant trend is to define the public domain negatively.236 
There is, however, a third constitutional hook: the existence of a public 
domain is essential to fulfilling the constitutional mandate to “promote 
progress.” To justify its grant of a limited monopoly right in creative works, 
copyright law must incentivize the creation of new works. The resulting 
expansion of the corpus of collective knowledge “promote[s] progress.” This 
justification is referred to as the “incentives-access tradeoff.” Simplistically, it 
runs something like this: in exchange for a limited monopoly over an author’s 
creative work—which provides her with a financial reward that will 
(theoretically) incentivize her to continue producing new creative works—the 
author will eventually provide the public with free access to her works. Under 
current copyright law, the public receives this free access seventy years after the 
death of the author (with some exceptions, of course).237 The incentives-access 
justification is the predominant justification for copyright protection in the 
United States.238 But what incentives or resources do authors need in order to 
produce creative works? Money, perhaps.239 But authors also need inspiration, 
and inspiration is often derived from other creative works.240 
When grappling with the amount of protection to afford to a historical 
exposé, Judge Frank Easterbrook plainly acknowledged the derivative nature 
of creativity and the inefficiency that may result from granting works too 
much protection: 
 
236 It is always easier to point to what something is not than define what it is. See THOMAS 
MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §1.01(2) (3d ed. 1996) 
(“Public domain is the rule: intellectual property is the exception.”); Public Domain, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“The universe of inventions and creative works that are not protected 
by intellectual-property rights and are therefore available for anyone to use without charge.”). 
237 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2012). 
238 See infra note 239 (questioning whether this incentives logic really works) and note 243 
(providing a more sophisticated economic analysis of the tradeoff between access and incentives). 
239 But see Diane Lennheer Zimmerman, Copyright as Incentives: Did We Just Imagine That?, 12 
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 29, 32 (2011) (“Because an almost linear relationship between the 
opportunity to reap profits and the incentive to produce is so commonly presumed as a theoretical 
matter . . . there has been relatively little critical evaluation of the empirical legitimacy of the 
theoretical assumptions about copyright as an incentive.”). 
240 Many artists plainly acknowledge that their creativity is necessarily and unabashedly 
derivative. See, e.g., William Burroughs, Les Voleurs, in THE ADDING MACHINE (1985) (“Out of the 
closets and into the museums, libraries, architectural monuments, concert halls, bookstores, 
recording studios and film studios of the world. Everything belongs to the inspired and dedicated 
thief . . . . A bas l’originalité, the sterile and assertive ego that imprisons us as it creates.”); DALI BY 
DALI 137 (Eleanor R. Morse trans. 1970) (“Those who do not want to imitate anything, produce 
nothing.”); Letter from Mark Twain to Helen Keller (March 17, 1903), in 2 MARK TWAIN’S 
LETTERS 730, 731 (Albert Bigelow Paine ed. 1917) (“As if there was much of anything in any human 
utterance, oral or written, except plagiarism! The kernel, the soul—let us go further and say the 
substance, the bulk, the actual and valuable material of all human utterances—is plagiarism.”). 
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Intellectual (and artistic) progress is possible only if each author builds on 
the work of others. No one invents even a tiny fraction of the ideas that make 
up our cultural heritage. Once a work has been written and published, any 
rule requiring people to compensate the author slows progress in literature 
and art, making useful expressions “too expensive,” forcing authors to re-
invent the wheel, and so on. Every work uses scraps of thought from 
thousands of predecessors, far too many to compensate even if the legal 
system were frictionless, which it isn’t. Because any new work depends on 
others even if unconsciously, broad protection of intellectual property also 
creates a distinct possibility that the cost of litigation—old authors trying to 
get a “piece of the action” from current successes—will prevent or penalize 
the production of new works, even though the claims be rebuffed.241 
The gist of the passage: all authors need to draw on past creativity in order 
to generate future creativity.242 Without a public domain, Judge Easterbrook 
suggests, there would be a dynamic inefficiency as new creativity is blocked 
by the monopoly rights of prior creators.243 We saw this issue emerge clearly 
in the ontologies of reality for Creator2 and Creator3. 
Thus, the requirement that copyright law promote creativity, paired with 
the essentially derivative nature of creativity, points us toward an alternative, 
positive definition of the public domain. The public domain may be 
understood as a reservoir of resources generally accessible by the public for 
use without restriction.244 Understood as such, the public domain is an 
 
241 Nash v. CBS, Inc., 899 F.2d 1537, 1540-41 (7th Cir. 1990). 
242 Id. at 1541 (“[E]very author is simultaneously a creator in part and a borrower in part.”); see 
also David Lange, Reimagining the Public Domain, 66 L. & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 463, 472 
(2003) (“Creativity and appropriation are inseparable, as inseparable as creativity and memory, and 
in my judgment they should remain so.”). 
243 Glynn S. Lunney, Jr. has provided a sophisticated economic analysis of the potential 
inefficiencies in the incentives-access tradeoff, alluded to by Judge Easterbrook in the above passage: 
As copyright protection broadens, the incentive to produce any given work, measured 
by the expected return on the work, increases, but both the cost of creating new works 
and the deadweight loss associated with existing works also increase. At some point, 
given . . . an increasing marginal cost associated with further lost access, further 
expanding copyright’s protection will increase the cost of reusing an element to a 
level that ‘unduly’ discourages the creation of future works, or it will raise the price 
of access to an existing work to a level that unduly limits the work’s dissemination. 
At that point, the need for access would outweigh the need for incentives, and the 
incentives-access paradigm would demand a limit to copyright’s protection. 
Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Reexamining Copyright’s Incentives-Access Paradigm, 49 VAND. L. REV. 
483, 498 (1996). 
244 See, e.g., Lange, supra note 242, at 476 (“I am interested in the public domain as an 
affirmative source of entitlements capable of deployment, as, when and where required, against the 
encroachments upon the creative imagination threatened by intellectual property.”); Jessica Litman, 
The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 968 (1990) (“The public domain should be understood not 
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important resource for derivative creativity. Referring to the public domain 
as an “intellectual commons” illuminates this positive function.245 
Our current conceptual model allows for the extension of copyright 
protection into the third order of simulation—an author like Creator3 may 
obtain protection for her entire virtual world if she is the author and her work 
is minimally creative. The reality-is-commons metaphor has no power to 
prevent this. Courts must consider whether this is a desirable outcome in the 
age of new reality technologies, and if not, how copyright law might preserve 
the central role of reality as a referent for future creativity. Earlier, this 
Comment noted the potential for a more robust merger doctrine, where 
works might lose protection post hoc when they become commonplace parts 
of our communal independent reality.246 
On the other hand, courts may seek to stem the disappearance of reality-
as-commons by limiting protection for works in the second and third orders 
of simulation ex ante. Such an approach may remedy the potential dampening 
of an author’s incentives to create where the consequences of using reality-as-
referent are not clear (seen in the ontology of reality for Creator2). At the 
very least, the dynamic inefficiency would be lessened where the particular 
nature of reality-as-referent is minimally clear to the next creator. This would 
no doubt entail denying protection on the grounds of public policy to many 
works that are otherwise protectable, and thus would be a measure for 
Congress rather than the courts.247 
 
as the realm of material that is undeserving of protection, but as a device that permits the rest of 
the system to work by leaving the raw material of authorship available for authors to use.”). 
245 See, e.g., Samuel Oddi, The Tragicomedy of the Public Domain in Intellectual Property Law, 25 
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1, 8 n.13 (2002) (surveying definitions of the public domain). 
246 See supra note 233 (questioning whether such a regime would be judicially administrable). 
247 Thinkers have already begun to imagine how new reality technologies may be regulated in 
a future where they are commonplace parts of our everyday reality. Architect Fredrick Hellberg, for 
example, has imagined the possibilities of augmented reality in architecture: “Local governments 
will need regulation for [AR] in the future because it will become intrusive . . . . We need to create 
some sort of order. That will be the last phase of this digital revolution.” Sayer, supra note 223. Jason 
Sayer argues that Privately Owned Augmented Public Spaces (POAPS) may become common, 
analogizing them to privately owned public space. Id. The general issue of the anticommons that 
would emerge from such environments has already been flagged by those envisioning an augmented 
reality future. In his Code of Ethics on Human Augmentation, although mostly concerned with 
surveillance, privacy, and information access, Steve Mann addressed this concern about maintaining 
a “commons” for human expression. Steve Mann, Code of Ethics on Human Augmentation, in PEDDIE, 
supra note 12, at 16. One of the tenets of Mann’s code is that humans “have the power to create their 
own ‘digital identities’ and express themselves (e.g., to document their own lives, or to defend 
against false accusations), using data about them, whether in the real or virtual world.” Id. Similarly, 
in 2016 John Rousseau proposed three “laws of mixed reality,” one of which evidences this concern 
with the tragedy of the anticommons: “Mixed reality must respect boundaries between commerce 
and data.” Id. at 18. 
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The purpose of this Comment, however, is not to argue for adjustment to 
the conceptual model.248 This Comment merely flags these potential 
approaches in order to indicate that adjustment—inclusive of potentially major 
adjustment—may be required for our ontology of reality to balance the needs 
of progress and protection for expressive works in new reality technologies. 
CONCLUSION 
Reality in copyright law is not viewpoint neutral. Rather, it must be 
understood as a referent from the perspective of the next creator. In general, 
reality itself is not protected because it is not authored by the next creator; 
however, reality may be authored by other creators. 
As a resource for derivative creativity that is common to all, reality 
consists of things which have no human author (public domain reality) or 
were authored by other creators (externally created reality). While public 
domain reality may be freely copied, components of externally created reality 
may be protected by copyright law. Thus, the next creator must beware when 
using externally created reality as a referent for her own new expression. Such 
is the current ontology of copyright and reality. 
In a world where creativity is derivative, this ontology of reality highlights 
the importance of striking the balance between the needs of progress and 
protection for new reality technologies. Simulation—a relative newcomer to 
this ontology—will require further examination. Copyright protection for 
simulations—particularly simulations in the second and third order, where 
the simulation becomes indistinguishable from its referent—may deter the 
use of reality in general as a referent. Where her externally created reality 
includes simulations, the next creator may no longer be able to distinguish 
between public domain reality and externally created reality. Thus, she will 
be unable to predict how her use of reality-as-referent will affect her 
eligibility for copyright protection and the potential for infringement. 
In this way, a reality brimming with copyrighted works—such as is 
promised by “new reality” technologies—may lead to a problem of the anti-
commons, where prior rights-holders prevent the next creator from making 
productive use of reality as a resource for derivative creativity. On the other 
hand, we should be wary of allowing the prototype effect—where highly 
accurate works are understood to be less creative than inaccurate works—from 
extending so far as to deny protection for an accurate representation of any 
referent, without regard to its nature. Indeed, we must remember that not all 
components of reality are treated equally. 
 
248 See supra Section II.A (noting that this Comment will not engage in the last step of 
Koepsell’s commonsense ontology—adjustment). 
1326 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 167: 1269 
However, this ontology is only a start. As copyright law tackles a world 
increasingly overlaid with copyrightable works, the conceptual content of 
reality must not be left unexamined or unadjusted. 
